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Due process rights prevent the arbitrary deprivation of all other rights and liberties and 
ensure that the process undertaken to arrive at the determination of whether or when rights and 
liberties must be curtailed or deprived, is impartial and consistent.  The creation and operation of 
special courts and due process mechanisms to combat terrorism has facilitated the perpetuation 
of counterterrorism measures that violate due process and further enabled the erosion of other 
internationally recognized human rights.  Using qualitative methodology such as case analysis, 
legal research methods, process tracing, and comparative case studies, this thesis will evaluate 
the 1267 Regime’s human rights drawbacks, assess the judicial and institutional challenges 
brought against the Regime and their limited success but will ultimately conclude that the 
Regime still falls short of international human rights standards.  Special judicial and quasi-
judicial institutions maintained for the purpose of countering terrorism, such as the 1267 Regime, 
are founded on due process exceptionalism, making it impossible for them to carry out the 
purpose for which they were created while upholding human rights.  Thus, such paradigms are 
incompatible with human rights and must not be tolerated.  However, the UN’s continued 
enforcement of the Regime through Resolutions that interrupt states’ compliance with their own 
human rights obligations may only serve to discredit the Regime and deter states from 


















Due process rights, including the right to an effective remedy by a competent national 
tribunal, the right against arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, the right to a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal, the right to the presumption of innocence until proven 
guilty, and the right against conviction of an offense that does not constitute one under the law 
are the most central to the discourse on human rights violations resulting from counterterrorism 
policies.  They exist specifically to prevent the arbitrary deprivation of all other rights and 
liberties and to ensure that the process, undertaken to arrive at the determination of whether or 
when rights and liberties must be curtailed or deprived, is impartial and consistent.  Yet a brief 
overview of past and present counterterrorism measures, such as intelligence gathering by torture 
and mass surveillance, arbitrary detention, extraordinary rendition and drone warfare, listing 
mechanisms such as the no fly, as well as terrorist watch and sanctions lists reveals that the 
deprivation of due process rights has quite possibly served as the greatest counterterrorism tool.   
The creation and operation of special courts and due process mechanisms to combat 
terrorism has facilitated the perpetuation of counterterrorism measures that violate due process 
and further enabled the erosion of other internationally recognized human rights.  Often lacking 
transparency, impartiality and oversight due to overlapping legislative, judicial, and executive 
functions, as well as blurred intra-judicial roles of accuser, arbiter and jury, these special courts 
and quasi-judicial regimes run afoul of internationally and domestically recognized human rights 
standards.  This thesis will focus on one particular exceptional paradigm created in the name of 
counterterrorism and operating outside of internationally recognized human rights, the 1267 
Sanctions Regime. 
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On October 15, 1999, the UN Security Council, following the United States’ lead in 
passing the July 1999 Executive Order 13129 imposing sanctions on the Taliban regime, 
unanimously adopted Resolution 1267 as a counterterrorism measure with an eye on 
incapacitating the Taliban by imposing a limited air embargo and assets freeze pursuant to the 
Security Council’s authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  Resolution 1267 further 
established a Committee to oversee the implementation of the sanctions, conduct reviews, and 
provide annual reports to the Security Council.  
The 1267 Regime has evolved and divided as a result of numerous subsequent UN 
Security Council Resolutions.  Today, the Regime is one that imposes targeted asset freezes, 
travel bans, and arms embargos on those individuals associated with either the Taliban, Al-
Qaida, or ISIL, designated by their respective Committees to have met the vague and/or 
overbroad listing criteria.  The Regime has continued to face both institutional (from within the 
UN) and external judicial challenges.  Limited improvements have resulted from said challenges, 
but ultimately, those placed on the sanctions list continue to experience violations of their 
internationally recognized human rights and liberties as set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and further documented in certain country or 
region specific Covenants such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. Special judicial and quasi-judicial institutions maintained for the 
purpose of countering terrorism, such as the 1267 Regime, are founded on due process 
exceptionalism, making it impossible for such institutions to carry out the purpose for which they 
were created while upholding human rights. 
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Using qualitative methodology such as case analysis, legal research methods, process 
tracing, and comparative case studies, this thesis will evaluate the manner by which judicial 
mechanisms, such as the European Court of Justice, European Court of Human Rights and 
national courts, as well as non-judicial mechanisms, such as the human rights committee and 
special procedures, have been used to challenge the 1267 Regime.  It will further assess the 
successful changes stemming from such challenges, but will ultimately detail how despite 
improvements, the Regime still falls short of international human rights standards. 
In detailing both the ongoing human rights failures of the 1267 Regime despite attempts 
made to bring the Regime in line with international human rights and the repeated judicial 
challenges brought against the Regime, this work will support the position that international 
human rights and exceptional/extraordinary judicial/quasi-judicial regimes created to combat 
terrorism are mutually exclusive concepts, and therefore, 1267 and similar regimes cannot be 
seen as rights-compatible paradigms.  
1267 Sanctions Regime: Past to Present 
On October 15, 1999, shortly following the United States’ passage of Executive Order 
13129, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1267 as a counterterrorism 
measure with an eye on incapacitating the Taliban.  “Recalling” state party obligations to 
prosecute terrorists, “condemning” the “sheltering and training” of terrorists in Afghan territory, 
and “deploring” the Taliban’s protection of Usama bin Laden as well as his associates and their 
operation of terrorist training facilities, the Security Council, pursuant to its authority under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, imposed an asset freeze and air embargo on the Taliban, with 
exception to those funds or flights predetermined by the Security Council to have a humanitarian 
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need.1  Resolution 1267 further established a Committee (the “1267 Committee”) comprised of 
all Security Council members to oversee the implementation of sanctions, conduct reviews, as 
well as provide reports, observations, and recommendations to the Security Council.2  
On December 19, 2000, Resolution 1333 imposed an arms embargo on the Taliban and 
banned them from any military assistance, making exception for non-lethal materials and 
assistance necessary for humanitarian purposes, while at the same time subjected Al-Qaida to an 
asset freeze and financial embargo.3  Resolution 1333 also requested that the Secretary-General 
consult with the 1267 Committee in appointing an expert committee “to make recommendations” 
to the Security Council concerning the monitoring of sanctions, “to consult with” and “report on” 
Member States regarding sanction implementation and enforcement, and “to review the 
humanitarian implications.”4  Finally, this Resolution required the 1267 Committee to maintain 
lists of parties “designated as being associated with Usama bin Laden” and to consider “requests 
for exceptions” to the sanctions based on humanitarian or protective need.5   
An improvement to the Regime came on July 30, 2001 with Resolution 1363, which 
called for the establishment of a New York based Monitoring Group of up to five experts who 
would report to the 1267 Committee, as well as a Sanctions Enforcement Support Team that 
would report to the Monitoring Group at least once a month in order to monitor sanction 
implementation, assist states bordering Taliban controlled territory, and make recommendations 
concerning violations of sanctions measures.6 
																																																								
1 See UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4051st 
meeting on 15 Oct. 1999, 15 Oc. 1999, S/RES/1267. 
2 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1267, Para. 6. 
3 See UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4251st 
meeting, on 19 Dec. 2000, 19 Dec. 2000, S/RES/1333, Para. 5-6, 8. 
4 UN Security Council, Resolution 1333, Para. 15. 
5 UN Security Council, Resolution 1333, Para 16. 
6 See UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1363 (2001) on the Situation in Afghanistan, 30 Jul. 
2001, S/RES/1363, Para. 3-5. 
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Resolution 1390, adopted on January 16, 2002, imposed an arms embargo on Al-Qaida 
and also imposed a travel ban on both Taliban and Al-Qaida unless travel was determined to be 
necessary for judicial process or otherwise justified.7  Thus, sanctions that were associated only 
with Afghan territories under the control of the Taliban now covered “Usama bin Laden, 
members of the Al-Qaida organization and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, 
undertakings and entities associated with them.”8  Resolution 1617 clarified “associated with” to 
mean those individuals:  
participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of 
acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in 
support of; supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to; 
recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of; Al-Qaida, Usama bin 
Laden or the Taliban, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof[.]9  
 
Resolutions 1452, 1526, and 1617 were subsequent upgrades to the Regime.  The first 
safeguarded certain funds, assets, or resources from freezing that were necessary to purchase 
food or housing, or pay utilities, medical expenses, taxes, insurance, professional fees, or other 
extraordinary expenses.10  The next created an Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring 
Team, replacing the earlier Monitoring Group, and required periodic reports to the 1267 
Committee concerning Member State implementation or non-compliance of sanctions measures 
while also incorporating recommendations for improvement.11  The last requested that proposals 
be submitted with a statement of case, in addition to information identifying the individual’s 
																																																								
7 See UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1390 (2002) on the Situation in Afghanistan, 16 Jan. 
2002, S/RES/1390, Para. 2. 
8 UN Security Council, Resolution 1390, Para. 2. 
9 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1617 (2005) Threats to International Peace and Security 
Caused by Terrorist Acts, 29 Jul. 2005, S/RES/1617, Para. 2. 
10 See UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1452 (2002) On the Threats to International Peace and 
Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, 20 Dec. 2002, S/RES/1452, Para. 1. 
11 See UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1526 (2004) On Improving Implementation of Measures 
Imposed by Paragraph 4 (b) of Resolution 1267 (1999), Paragraph 8 (c) of Resolution 1333 (2000) and Paragraphs 
1 and 2 of Resolution 1390 (2002) on Measures Against Al-Qaida and the Taliban, 30 Jan. 2004, S/RES/1526, Para. 
6, 8, Annex to Resolution 1526 (2004). 
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association with the Taliban, Al-Qaida, or Usama bin Laden as already required by Resolution 
1526.  Resolution 1617 also requested that states inform listed parties of the measures against 
them, the procedures involved in the listing and delisting schemes, as well as the availability of 
exemptions.12 
  Noticeably, a mechanism for the appeal of listings was absent until 2006, when the 
Security Council, through Resolution 1730, requested that the Secretary-General establish a 
“Focal Point” to accept delisting petitions, liaise between Member States and the 1267 
Committee, and inform a petitioner of his/her listing status and procedures.13  Petitioners could 
seek delisting through the Focal Point, their state of nationality, or the state in which they 
resided. 14   Delisting requests made through the Focal Point would be forwarded to the 
government that designated the listed party, the government where the listed individual lived, 
and the one in which he/she bore citizenship for appropriate input.15  The governments’ 
recommendations for delisting or retention, as well as accompanying rationale, would be 
presented to the Focal Point or 1267 Committee.16  If none of the aforementioned governments 
acted within 3 months, any other member of the 1267 Committee would be able, within the next 
month, to recommend delisting after checking with the designating government.17  Inaction by 
any Committee member would result in rejection.18   
  Resolution 1735 affirmed that listing requests be submitted with a standardized cover 
sheet, a statement of case supporting that the listing criteria had been met, and any information 
																																																								
12 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1617, Para. 4-5. 
13 See UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1730 (2006) General Issues Relating to Sanctions, 19 Dec. 
2006, S/RES/1730, Para. 1, Annex: De-Listing Procedure. 
14 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1730, Annex: De-Listing Procedure. 
15 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1730, Annex: De-Listing Procedure. 
16 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1730, Annex: De-Listing Procedure. 
17 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1730, Annex: De-Listing Procedure. 
18 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1730, Annex: De-Listing Procedure. 
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that demonstrated a link between the proposed individual and an already listed party.19  Portions 
of the information suitable for release to listed individuals, entities, or interested states were to be 
specified as such.20  The Resolution further outlined the following criteria to be evaluated when 
assessing delisting requests:  
(i) whether the individual or entity was placed on the Consolidated List due to a 
mistake of identity, or (ii) whether the individual or entity no longer meets the 
criteria set out in relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 1617 (2005); in 
making the evaluation in (ii) above, the Committee may consider, among other 
things, whether the individual is deceased, or whether it has been affirmatively 
shown that the individual or entity has severed all association, as defined in 
resolution 1617 (2005), with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, the Taliban, and their 
supporters, including all individuals and entities on the Consolidated List.21  
 
Finally, Resolution 1735 extended the Monitoring Team’s mandate while outlining its duties to 
include analyzing reports submitted to it; providing reports and recommendations to the 1267 
Committee concerning sanction implementation and non-compliance, changing terrorism threats, 
and the Team’s activities and work; and consulting and information sharing with Member States, 
relevant organizations, intelligence and security services, as well as relevant UN bodies to 
strengthen the Regime, coordinate and enhance cooperation among parties while preventing 
overlap and promoting awareness.22     
Resolution 1822 directed the 1267 Committee to make a summary of listing reasons 
concerning the listed parties available on its website, and recommended reviewing the list yearly 
to ensure that the continued presence of specific listings remain justified and accurate.23  
Resolution 1904 established the Office of the Ombudsperson to review delisting requests 
instead of the Focal Point.24  The Ombudsperson would be an individual “of high moral 																																																								
19 See UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1735 (2006) Threats to International Peace and Security 
Caused by Terrorist Acts, 22 Dec. 2006, S/RES/1735, Para. 5, 7. 
20 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1735, Para. 6. 
21 UN Security Council, Resolution 1735, Para. 14. 
22 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1735, Para. 32, Annex II. 
23 See UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1822 (2008) On Continuation of Measures Imposed 
Against the Taliban and Al-Qaida, 30 Jun. 2008, S/RES/1822, Para. 13, 22. 
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character, impartiality and integrity with high qualifications” that would act independently and 
impartially “neither seek[ing] nor receiv[ing] instructions from any government.”25  Delisting 
through the Ombudsperson was a 3-phase process, which began with a two to four month 
“Information Gathering” stage during which the Ombudsperson confirmed receipt of the 
petitioner’s delisting requests, advised the petitioner on the process, and conducted preliminary 
reviews of the request to ensure its sufficiency, only returning it to the petitioner when further 
information was necessary.26  The Ombudsperson then forwarded the request to the 1267 
Committee, the Monitoring Team, relevant states, and UN subsidiaries for review, input, and 
recommendations.27  Upon completion of this stage, the Ombudsperson provided an update to 
the 1267 Committee and then endeavored upon a “Dialogue” phase with petitioner for a period 
of two to four months, during which the Ombudsperson may have requested further information 
from the petitioner to be sent to requesting parties, and otherwise, facilitated the information 
sharing process among the relevant parties and petitioner.28  The Ombudsperson, together with 
the Monitoring Team, then provided a “Comprehensive Report” to the 1267 Committee that 
synthesized all relevant non-confidential information and delisting arguments, as well as 
described the Ombudsperson’s work throughout the process.29  The third and final stage was the 
“Committee Discussion and Decision,” during which the 1267 Committee was given thirty days 
to review the request and place it on the agenda for consideration, at which time the 
Ombudsperson and Monitoring Team presented the report and field questions. 30   If the 
Committee granted the request, the Ombudsperson informed the petitioner and the listing was 																																																																																																																																																																																		
24 See UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009) On Continuation of Measures Imposed 
Against the Taliban and Al-Qaida, 17 Dec. 2009, S/RES/1904, Para. 21. 
25 UN Security Council, Resolution 1904, Para. 20. 
26 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1904, Annex II, Para. 1, 4. 
27 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1904, Annex II, Para. 2, 3. 
28 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1904, Annex II, Para. 5, 6. 
29 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1904, Annex II, Para. 7. 
30 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1904, Annex II, Para. 8, 9. 
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removed.  However, if the Committee denied the request, it was required to provide an 
explanation and updated listing reasons to the Ombudsperson, who in turn, sent a letter to the 
petitioner within 15 days regarding the decision, while respecting the confidentiality of certain 
information.31  The Ombudsperson was additionally tasked with distributing non-confidential 
procedural information, apprising individuals or entities of their listing status, and submitting 
reports of its activities to the Security Council.32   
A major organizational change to the Regime came in 2011 through Security Council 
Resolutions 1988 (2011) and 1989 (2011).  The 1267 Consolidated List no longer covered both 
Taliban and Al-Qaida individuals and entities, and neither did the 1267 Committee cover 
sanctions for both groups.33  Instead, the 1267 Committee became the Al-Qaida Sanctions 
Committee, while the newly created 1988 Committee covered listings related to the Taliban.34  In 
2015, Resolution 2253 expanded the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions List to include ISIL 
(Da’esh) and imposed on them all sanctions that were previously imposed on Al-Qaida.35 
Listing Procedures/Delisting Procedures Refined with Respect to Separate Sanctions 
Regimes: 1988 Taliban Sanctions Regime 
 
Security Council Resolution 2082 further refined the 1988 Taliban Sanctions Regime, 
once again outlining the listing/delisting procedures, but this time, only as they related to the 
Taliban.  Under the 1988 Sanctions Regime, Member States were to consult with the 																																																								
31 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1904, Annex II, Para. 11-14. 
32 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1904, Annex II, Para. 15. 
33 See UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1988 (2011) On Establishment of a New Sanctions 
Committee Focusing on the Threat From Those Associated With the Taliban, 17 Jun. 2011, S/RES/1988, Para. 1, 2, 
30; UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1989 (2011) On Expansion of the Mandate of the 
Ombudsperson Established by the Resolution 1267 (1999) and the Establishment of a New Al-Qaida Sanctions List, 
17 Jun. 2011, S/RES/1989, Para. 2, 3. 
34 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1988; UN Security Council, Resolution 1989, Para. 2, 3. 
35 See UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2253 (2015) On Renaming of Al-Qaida Sanctions 
Committee as “1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee” and the Al-Qaida Sanctions List 
as "ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List" and on Extension of the Mandate the Office of the Ombudsperson 
for a Period of 24 Months From the Date of Expiration of its Current Mandate in Dec. 2017, 17 Dec. 
2015, S/RES/2253, Para. 1-10. 
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Government of Afghanistan prior to submitting to the 1988 Committee the names of, sufficient 
identifying information for, and detailed statement of case concerning, those individuals or 
groups: “[p]articipating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts 
or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of; 
[s]upplying, selling or transferring arms and related material to; [r]ecruiting for; or [o]therwise 
supporting acts or activities of those designated and other individuals, groups, undertakings and 
entities associated with the Taliban….”36  The 1988 Committee, in conjunction with the 
Monitoring Team and designating states, were required to publish a summary of listing reasons 
on the Committee’s website when the name was listed.37  Within three days, the 1988 Committee 
was to provide notice to the Afghanistan Government, the Permanent Missions of Afghanistan, 
and the states where the listed is located and/or a citizen of.38  The listing procedures were less 
adequate than the delisting procedures. 
In delisting, the 1988 Committee was to remove names that “no longer meet the listing 
criteria” and give consideration for removal to those who have “reconciled” in accordance with 
the principles set forth in the 20 July 2010 Kabul Conference Communiqué.39  Reconciliation 
under the aforementioned principles applied to those who “renounce violence, have no links to 
international terrorist organizations, respect the Constitution and are willing to join in building a 
peaceful Afghanistan.”40  Consultation and cooperation between Member States and 1988 
Committee on the one hand and the Government of Afghanistan on the other, with assistance 
from the UN Assistance Missions in Afghanistan where appropriate, was encouraged in order to 																																																								
36 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2082 (2012) On Implementation of Measures to Implement 
Sanctions List Concerning Individuals and Entities and Other Groups and Undertakings Associated With the 
Taliban, 17 Dec. 2012, S/RES/2082, Para. 3, 11, 12, 16. 
37 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2082, Para. 13.  
38 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2082, Para. 17.  
39 UN Security Council, Resolution 2082, Para. 18.   
40 Communiqué. International Conference on Afghanistan, Kabul. 20 Jul. 2010, Para. 14; see also Conference 
Conclusions.  The International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn. 5 Dec. 2011, Para. 18. 
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facilitate greater information sharing as to the following items: High Peace Council 
communications or Strengthening Peace Programme documentation supporting “reconciliation”, 
death certificates, and Afghanistan Government information demonstrating cessation of support 
or participation in acts threatening Afghanistan’s stability.41  If the 1988 Committee granted a 
delisting request, the Secretariat was to inform the Afghanistan Government and the Permanent 
Missions of Afghanistan, the state where the individual was located, and/or the state of 
nationality to assist in timely notifying the newly delisted party.42  Of course, if a previously 
delisted individual re-engaged in sanctionable acts, Member States with knowledge updated the 
1988 Committee accordingly.43   Further, the Afghanistan Government was to update the 
Committee yearly regarding those individuals delisted the previous year in accordance with the 
principles of reconciliation.44   
Individuals and entities who pursued delisting and who were not sponsored by Member 
States may have submitted their requests through the Focal Point established in Security Council 
Resolution 1730 (2006) and discussed above.45  Overall, the listing and delisting processes in the 
1988 Sanctions List were far more inclusive of the Afghanistan Government than the 1989 
Regime was inclusive of any particular government. 
Listing Procedures/Delisting Procedures Refined with Respect to Separate Sanctions 
Regimes: 1267/1989/2253 Al-Qaida/ISIL Sanctions Regime 
 
Security Council Resolution 2083 further refined the 1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Regime, 
outlining the listing/delisting procedures applicable to Al-Qaida.  However, when Resolution 
2253 expanded the authority of the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee to include ISIL 
																																																								
41 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2082, Para. 21. 
42 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2082, Para. 24. 
43 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2082, Para. 22. 
44 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2082, Para. 22. 
45 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2082, Para. 20. 
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(Da’esh), it also re-outlined an updated version of the listing and delisting procedures as they 
applied to both Al-Qaida and ISIL. 
According to these listing procedures, Member States were to submit listing requests for 
those “participating, by any means, in the financing or support of acts or activities of ISIL, Al-
Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities.”46  Requests were to 
include the standard form provided in Resolution 1735, a statement of explanation for the 
request, information pertinent to identifying the proposed party, and should have further 
indicated which information was releasable and whether the designating state’s identity was to 
remain confidential.47  The submission of photos was encouraged, when legal, for sharing with 
INTERPOL.48  Member States, relevant organizations, and the Monitoring Team were to share 
information with the Committee relevant to making decisions on listing requests and maintain 
accurate listing reasons that would be published simultaneously with a name’s inclusion on the 
list.49  Within three days after publication, the Secretariat was to notify the Permanent Missions 
of the states where the listed was located and/or a national to facilitate relaying to the listed, the 
reasons and effects of his/her listing, and the availability of and procedures for delisting and 
exemptions.50  
Delisting may have been made through the Ombudsperson in accordance, for the most 
part, with the procedures set forth in Security Council Resolution 1904 and reiterated, with minor 
changes, in Annex II of Security Council Resolution 2253.  The updated listing procedures 
increased the Information Gathering phase to 4 months with a 2-month extension, if needed.51  
																																																								
46 UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Para. 43. 
47 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Para. 45, 46. 
48 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Para. 47. 
49 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Para. 49-51. 
50 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Para. 52-53. 
51 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Annex II, Para. 1-5. 
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The Dialogue stage was updated to require the petitioner’s signed statement of disengagement 
and disassociation from Al-Qaida and/or ISIL and to include meetings with petitioner where 
possible.52  The Ombudsperson could request travel and assets freeze exemptions to facilitate 
meetings.53  The Committee’s time to review the Ombudsperson’s Comprehensive Report was 
shortened to 15 days, with no more than 30 days to consider the request.54  Where the 
Ombudsperson recommended retention, the sanctions remained in effect, absent submission of a 
delisting request by a Committee member, which would have initiated consideration via the 
Committee’s usual decision-making process.55  If, however, the Ombudsperson recommended 
delisting, sanctions ceased 60 days after the Committee reviewed the report, unless the 
Committee was in consensus that the sanctions should remain.56  If the Committee was not able 
to reach a consensus, the sanctions remained in place while the Chair submitted the delisting 
request to the Security Council for a decision within 60 days.57  Any stage of the process may 
have been shortened where appropriate.58 
Member States are to participate in listing and delisting by submitting relevant 
information, and are additionally encouraged to submit delisting requests on behalf of deceased 
individuals or entities no longer in existence, and to urge individuals to petition delisting through 
the Ombudsperson prior to regional courts. 59  While confidentiality of Member State 
communications with the Committee and Member States’ status as designating states is still 
respected, the latter is no longer assumed.60  Resolution 1904 encouraged designating states to 
																																																								
52 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Annex II, Para. 7. 
53 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Para. 74. 
54 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Annex II, Para. 9-11. 
55 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Annex II, Para. 14. 
56 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Annex II, Para. 15. 
57 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Annex II, Para. 15. 
58 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253. Annex II, Para. 3, 6, 56-57, 63-64. 
59 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Para. 45, 60, 61, 68. 
60 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Para. 46, Annex II, Para. 8, 18. 
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specify whether the Committee “may make known” the state’s identity as a “designating” state to 
another requesting Member State, 61 whereas Resolution 2253 required designating states to 
specify to the Committee or Ombudsperson whether their identity as designating states “may not 
[be] ma[d]e known”62.  Within three days of a name’s delisting, the Secretariat must inform the 
Permanent Missions of the states of residence, location and/or nationality so that the delisted 
may be notified.63  
The Focal Point, though no longer accepting delisting requests in accordance with its 
initial mandate as set forth in Security Council Resolution 1730, would now receive requests 
from individuals or entities for exemptions from financial sanctions as permitted by Resolution 
1452 and from travel sanctions for religious reasons, judicial processes, or other justified 
purposes.64  Exemptions are first submitted to the requester’s state of residence, then to the Focal 
Point, and thereafter forwarded to the Committee with relevant states, such as states of entry and 
travel in the case of travel ban exemption requests.65  Decisions on asset freeze exemptions are 
made within 3-5 days, while those for travel exemptions do not have a specified timeframe.66  
The Focal Point may also receive and forward to the Committee for assessment with help from 
the Monitoring Team and relevant states, communications from delisted individuals experiencing 
sanctions, and those claiming mistaken identity, for a response within 60 days.67 
Exemption requests in the Al-Qaida/ISIL Sanctions Regime stand in stark contrast to 
those provided for in the Taliban Sanctions Regime.  In the latter, exemptions from financial and 
asset freezes are to be submitted by Member States to the Committee while exemptions from 																																																								
61 UN Security Council, Resolution 1904, Para. 12. 
62 UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Para. 46. 
63 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Para. 73. 
64 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Para. 10, 75-76. 
65 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Para. 76. 
66 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Para. 10, 74-75. 
67 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, Para. 77-78. 
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travel bans are welcomed from the Afghanistan Government in coordination with the High Peace 
Council in view of Afghanistan’s peace and reconciliation process among its people.68  The 
Committee is to consider travel exemption requests to locations when “necessary [for] 
participat[ion] in meetings in support of peace and reconciliation,” so long as requests are 
submitted with travel document numbers, points of destination and transit, and a period of travel 
not to exceed nine months.69   
The implementation of sanctions pursuant to the Listing schemes above deprive 
individuals of internationally recognized rights without affording them certain due process 
guarantees prior to executing such deprivation. 
Human Rights Deficits 
The 1988 Taliban Sanctions Regime and 1267/1989/2253 Al-Qaida/ISIL Sanctions 
Regime impact a number of internationally recognized human rights found in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as further documented 
in certain country or region specific Covenants such as the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  One of the UN’s founding principles 
as stated in its Charter is “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth 
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”70  
The Charter reiterates this principle in both Articles 1 and 55, where it states in no uncertain 
terms that the UN is to promote and encourage “universal respect for, and observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
																																																								
68 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2082, Para. 8-10. 
69 UN Security Council, Resolution 2082, Para. 9. 
70 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 Oct. 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
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religion.”71 
Despite improvements made over the years to mitigate the Sanctions Regime’s impact on 
human rights, violations still persist.  The following is a summary of procedural and substantive 
human rights that have been at stake from the time of the Regime’s inception, without distinction 
as to whether the violation of said rights has since been mitigated or eradicated. 
Human Rights Deficits: Due Process Rights 
No one is to be arbitrarily deprived of rights or liberties.72  Rather, everyone has the right 
to be presumed innocent until he or she is granted, without undue delay, a fair and public trial 
before a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal in the determination of their rights.73  A 
fair trial encompasses further minimum guarantees to an individual, such to be apprised of the 
case, to have the opportunity to obtain interpreters and counsel, to prepare a defense, to attend 
the proceedings, to confront the witnesses without being compelled to testify against him or 
herself, and to be protected a second trial for the same case.74  Once a tribunal issues a decision, 
the individual subject to that decision must have the opportunity to appeal75 and there must be a 
remedy available for any unfounded deprivation of rights.76   
The individuals and entities targeted by the Sanctions Regime are deprived of certain 
substantive rights through an arguably arbitrary process that does not afford them the basic 
minimum due process requirements typical of judicial processes considered consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights.  The Sanction Regime’s procedural standards were 																																																								
71 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Art. 1, 55. 
72 See UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), 10 Dec. 1948, 217 A (III), Art. 
3; UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), 16 Dec.1966, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, Art. 9; Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”), as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 Nov.1950, ETS 
5, Art. 5. 
73 See ICCPR, Art. 14; UDHR, Art. 10, 11; ECHR, Art. 6. 
74 See ICCPR, Art. 14; ECHR, Protocol 7, Art. 4. 
75 See ICCPR, Art. 14; ECHR, Protocol 7, Art. 2, Art. 3. 
76 See ICCPR, Art. 2; UDHR, Art. 8; ECHR, Art. 13. 
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created by and for the UN without the engagement of the usual legislative or constitutional 
processes underlying the creation of rights-abiding adjudicative mechanisms applicable to the 
accused.  The justification given by the UN Security Council is that the measures are 
“preventative in nature and [therefore] not reliant upon criminal standards set out under national 
law”77.  Listing designations are not “legal determinations per se, but rather political findings of 
association with [terrorist regimes; and] [d]esignations are intended to be temporary…[thereby] 
not requir[ing] the same evidentiary standards associated with criminal prosecutions. 
Nonetheless, the open-ended[ness] of UN sanctions have had serious punitive effects … leading 
courts to find violations of due process.”78  
Since the sanctions have a punitive effect and result in violations of other substantive 
rights, the decision making process of imposing them should be viewed in light of minimum due 
process standards afforded to those facing deprivation of rights.  In this respect, those parties 
subject to the Sanctions Regime do not have a proper avenue through which they can be heard 
prior to the imposition of sanctions.  The presumption, therefore, is not one of innocence, but 
rather, of guilt, in that the Regime imposes sanctions akin to a criminal sentence upon 
individuals and entities, without ever having afforded them a fair and public trial before a 
competent, independent, and impartial tribunal.  The proceedings are administrative or special in 
nature and only require the participation of relevant Member States, sanction Committees, and 
other UN established mechanisms, such as the Monitoring Team, Ombudsperson, and Focal 
Point.  The individual or party subject to the sanctions is unable to select his/her own 
representative to be present at the proceedings and is not notified of the case against him/her 
until they are listed.  Confronting witnesses is not an option as the process is one of investigation 																																																								
77 UN Security Council, Resolution 1735. 
78 Eckert, Sue E. and Biersteker, Thomas J. Due Process and Targeted Sanctions: An Update of the “Watson 
Report.” Rhode Island: Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2012. 4. 
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and data collection, shared only between Member States and UN subsidiaries, leaving the 
communications and much of the information, confidential, at least as it applies, to the listed 
party’s right to know.  The state designating the individual may actually keep its status as a 
designating state completely confidential.  Thus, the decision to impose sanctions is one made 
through a process that takes place outside of the listed individual’s or party’s knowledge, 
awareness, or comprehension.  Only after the sanctions are imposed is the listed party able to 
partake by appealing the decision in the form of a removal request, which although was not even 
possible until years after the Regime began, lacks the basic structure of a standard judicial 
appeal.  Furthermore, once delisted, individuals and parties may be relisted through a process 
that remains silent as to whether past actions may contribute to the party’s relisting, contributing 
to a lack of clarity in relation to whether there is adherence to certain double jeopardy standards 
internationally recognized as befitting of a sound judicial process.  Finally, there is no remedy 
available to those erroneously placed on the sanctions list.  As a result of the Regime’s lack of 
due process safeguards, the deprivation of certain substantive rights resulting from imposition of 
the sanctions can be characterized as arbitrary. 
Human Rights Deficits: Substantive Rights  
All individuals are entitled to certain civil, political, economic, social, and cultural 
liberties, including the right to freedom of movement and right to leave one’s country;79 the right 
to own property without arbitrary deprivation of same;80 the right to self-determination, which 
incorporates freely pursuing economic development, freely disposing of wealth and resources, 
and not being deprived of subsistence;81 the right to work and earn an adequate standard of living 
																																																								
79 See ICCPR, Art. 12; UDHR, Art. 13.; ECHR, Protocol 4, Art. 2. 
80 See UDHR, Art. 17; ECHR, Protocol, Art. 1. 
81 See ICCPR, Art. 1; UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”), 16 Dec. 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3, Art. 1. 
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that includes food, clothing, housing, medical care; 82  the right against interference with privacy, 
family,83 home, and correspondence and against attacks upon honor and reputation;84  and the 
freedom to associate85.  
A travel ban certainly restricts one’s right to freely move86 within territories or leave 
one’s state.  An asset or financial freeze directly impacts one’s individual right to the propert(ies) 
frozen87 and arbitrarily does so without the minimum standards of due process discussed above.  
Financial freezes further prohibit one from disposing of his/her wealth and resources in a manner 
of their choosing.  Sanctions in general harm one’s reputation,88 limiting their ability to procure 
employment, and thereby, deprive them of economic development.  While certain exemptions 
were added to the regime to limit the restrictive nature of sanctions on funds considered 
necessary to secure a home, food, medical care, and the likes, the imposition of sanctions may 
still adversely affect one’s subsistence and ability to maintain an adequate standard of living, or 
at the very least, the standard of living the party had maintained prior to the sanctions.  The 
effects on the listed individual’s reputation certainly trickles down into the individual’s family 
life and privacy,89 impacting the family’s, third party civil, political, economic, cultural, and 
social rights, and causes undue psychological distress in certain situations, lending to eventual 
destruction of the family unit90. Freedom of association is another third party right affected.91  																																																								
82 See UDHR, Art. 23, 25; ICESCR, Art. 6, 11. 
83 See ICESCR, Art. 10. 
84 See ICCPR, Art. 17; UDHR, Art. 12; ECHR, Art. 8. 
85 See ICCPR, Art. 21, 22; UDHR, Art. 20; ECHR, Art. 11. 
86 See Fassbender, Bardo. “Targeted Sanctions Imposed by the UN Security Council and Due Process Rights: A 
Study Commissioned by the UN Office of Legal Affairs and Follow-Up Action by the United Nations.” 
International Organizations Law Review, 3.2 (2006): 437-485, n. 63. 
87 See Eckert, Sue E. and Biersteker, Thomas J. Addressing Challenges to Targeted Sanctions: An Update of the 
“Watson Report.” Rhode Island: Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2009. 15; 
Fassbender. “Targeted Sanctions Imposed by the UN Security Council and Due Process Rights,” n. 63. 
88 See Fassbender. “Targeted Sanctions Imposed by the UN Security Council and Due Process Rights,” n. 63. 
89 See Fassbender. “Targeted Sanctions Imposed by the UN Security Council and Due Process Rights,” n. 63. 
90 See UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, 3 Aug. 2009, A/64/211, Para. 40. 
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Questionable association is a crucial prerequisite to the imposition of sanctions. Thus, 
individuals may avoid even harmless associations with those, be it friends or family, who may be 
subject to scrutiny for their own associations with certain terrorist regimes.  This association, 
specifically when it involves a husband and wife, may also come into question with respect to a 
wife’s ownership of property or bank accounts with her husband, such that these rights may be 
deprived from her arbitrarily. 
Human Rights Deficits: Equal Protection 
All are born equal, must be seen as equal before the law, and are entitled to the 
applications and protections of the law, without distinction as to “race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”92  
Article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination recognizes “the right of everyone without distinction as to race, colour, or 
national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the … right to 
equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice.”93  
In his 2007 Report addressing racial profiling while countering terrorism, Special 
Rapporteur Martin Scheinin cited the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s 
call on states to ensure that counter terrorism measures do not discriminate in purpose or effect.94  
Differentiation based on national origin, ethnicity or religion must serve a legitimate aim and the 
treatment of individuals differentiated must be proportionate to that aim.95  Though fighting 
terrorism is a legitimate aim, proportionality must still be assessed in light of whether the 																																																																																																																																																																																		
91 See UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, 16 Aug. 2006, A/61/267. 
92 ICCPR, Art. 2, 3, 14, 16, 26; UDHR, Art. 1, 2, 6, 7; ICESCR, Art. 2, 3; ECHR, Art. 14 and Protocol 12, Art. 1. 
93 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 
Dec. 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195, Art. 5. 
94 See UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, 29 Jan. 2007, A/HRC/4/26, Para. 42-58. 
95 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Martin Scheinin, A/HRC/4/26, Para. 42-58. 
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practice is a “suitable and effective means of countering terrorism” and what adverse affects flow 
from the practice.96  
To be suitable and effective, the practice must be broad enough to include potential 
terrorists but narrowly tailored to exclude those who do not pose a threat.97  Scheinin found 
ethnicity, national origin, and religion to be “inaccurate indicators because the initial premise on 
which they are based, namely that Muslims and persons of Middle Eastern and South Asian 
appearance or origin are particularly likely to be involved in terrorist activities, is highly 
doubtful.”98  In support of his position, he cited to a study concluding that less than half of 
Islamic terrorists arrested or killed in Western states were born in the Middle East, and the 
Report of the Official Account of the London Bombings that confirmed the absence of a 
consistent profile when identifying those “vulnerable to radicalization.”99  Scheinin also posited 
that using ethnicity or national origin to determine religious affiliation is ineffective as “only 24 
per cent of all Arab Americans are Muslims [and] [i]n the United Kingdom, where Muslim 
religion is often associated with ‘Asian’ appearance, only half of those belonging to this ethnic 
group are in fact Muslims.”100  Thus, Scheinin concluded that such profiles are over-inclusive as 
“many of those matching [them] will not be, for example, Muslims [and] the overwhelming 
majority of those who are Muslims, for example, have of course nothing to do with terrorism.”101  
Since the practice is over-inclusive, it is also unsuitable and ineffective, and therefore, 
disproportionate in that it affects innocent people without producing tangible counter-terrorism 
results.102   																																																								
96 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Martin Scheinin, A/HRC/4/26, Para. 42-58. 
97 See Report of the Special Rapporteur, Martin Scheinin, A/HRC/4/26, Para. 42-58. 
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 24 
Even if justified, the practice’s adverse effects must still be assessed to determine their 
proportionality. 103   In this respect, Scheinin offers that profiling practices have a severe 
emotional toll on those affected and “translate into negative group effects [as they] single out 
persons for enhanced law-enforcement attention simply because they match a set of group 
characteristics, thus contributing to the social construction of all those who share these 
characteristics as inherently suspect.”104  He argued that “victimization and alienation” will result 
in distrust of law enforcement, citing the negative impact on community relations experienced by 
the UK Metropolitan Police Authority for their stop-and-search powers in the form of police 
distrust, racial and ethnic tension, and severance with valuable sources of intelligence.105 
The early version of the 1267 Sanctions Regime applied to Afghan territories under 
Taliban control, later expanding through Security Council Resolution 1390 to include “Usama 
bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organization and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, 
undertakings and entities associated with them.”106  The early version, therefore, used national 
origin and ethnicity as indicators of terrorist threat, exposing those subject to the Regime to the 
abbreviated version of justice due thereunder.  The post Resolution 1390 Regime, seemingly 
unintentionally, cured the discriminatory use of unsuccessful indicators by expanding the 
Regime to any individuals associated with the above-referenced terrorist groups, regardless of 
territory.  The impact of the rights outlined above has not gone unnoticed.   
Challenges/Limited Remedies 
As a result of the negative impact that the Regime has had and continues to have on the 
above-referenced human rights, non-judicial and judicial challenges have been brought against 
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the Regime to affect change.  The non-judicial challenges often come from within the UN 
through the Focal Point, the Ombudsperson, the Monitoring Team, the Human Rights Council’s 
Special Procedures, and the Human Rights Committee.  Listed individuals have also utilized 
judicial means, such as national and regional courts, to take the Regime to task.  The challenges 
brought by these mechanisms have been the impetus behind the progressive Security Council 
Resolutions passed to modify the regime in favor of a more fair, transparent, and consistent one.  
Overall, the current Regime is one that is far more in line with international human rights 
standards than the Regime of the past.  
The Regime now has an Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to monitor 
sanction implementation and non-compliance, as well as make recommendations for 
improvement of the Regime.  The Resolutions have also refined listing/delisting criteria and 
procedures.  Listing requests are now submitted with uniform cover letters, statements of case, 
supporting documentation, identifying information, and publicly releasable information, such as 
reasons for listing.  Delisting is now possible through the relevant Committee, or if requested by 
the listed individual or party, through the Focal Point and Ombudsperson.  Listed parties can also 
request exemptions to financial and travel sanctions.  Greater information sharing is evident 
between the Committees, Focal Point, Ombudsperson, other UN bodies, relevant Member States, 
organizations, intelligence and security agencies, and the listed individuals or groups.  This 
facilitates cooperation while preventing overlap.  Confidentiality of designating states is no 
longer assumed, and now, such states must specify if they wish to remain confidential.  More 
diligent efforts are made to keep listed parties apprised of their listed/delisted status, the reasons 
for their listing, and the status of their requests for delisting, as well as to involve them in the 
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delisting process by giving them an opportunity to respond and be heard.  Routine list reviews 
are conducted even if not prompted by a party’s request to keep lists updated.  
Certainly, the challenges brought through the Focal Point, Ombudsperson, Monitoring 
Team, Human Rights Council’s Special Procedures, Human Rights Committee, and national and 
regional courts are not the only impetuses behind the Regime’s positive changes; however, their 
simultaneous challenges, together, served as significant contributors, and therefore, the ones 
focused on here.  
Notably, human rights were not an issue of concern at the inception of the 1267 Sanctions 
Regime.107  They did not come to the forefront until the post 9/11 application of targeted 
sanctions.108  Immediately after 9/11, there was conspicuous complicity in passing nearly every 
designation made by the U.S. through to the List, even if they were based on unavailable 
classified information.109  Though this resulted from a combination of “sympathy and support” 
for the U.S., political scientist and professor of international security Thomas Biersteker thought 
this “relative lack of due diligence in this rather unusual period” set the stage for subsequent 
legal challenges.110  However, this uptick in caseload first brought with it an effort to secure 
commensurate resources for the 1267 Committee, particularly in the form of the Analytical 
Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team created in 2004 pursuant to Resolution 1526.111 
The Monitoring Team would submit periodic reports to the 1267 Committee concerning 
Member State implementation or non-compliance of sanctions measures, and incorporate 
																																																								
107 See Biersteker, Thomas J. “Targeted Sanctions and Individual Human Rights.” International Journal 65.1 
(Winter 2009-10): 99-117. 101. 
108 See Biersteker. “Targeted Sanctions and Individual Human Rights,” 101. 
109 See Biersteker. “Targeted Sanctions and Individual Human Rights,” 102; Foot, Rosemary. “The United Nations, 
Counter Terrorism and Human Rights: Institutional Adaptation and Embedded Ideas.” Human Rights Quarterly 29.2 
(May 2007): 489-514. 498; Rosand, Eric. “The Security Council’s Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al 
Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions.” The American Journal of International Law 98.4 (Oct. 2004): 745-763. 749. 
110 Biersteker. “Targeted Sanctions and Individual Human Rights,” 102. 
111 See Foot, 493. 
 27 
recommendations for improvement.  Today, the Monitoring Team greatly assists the 1988 and 
1989 Committees, as well as the Ombudsperson, in the listing and delisting processes, issues 
reports on Member State implementation, non-compliance with sanction measures, and the 
changing terrorist threat, makes recommendations for improvement to the Regimes incorporating 
information gathered from outside organs, UN subsidiaries, legal, and academic scholars, 
contributes to the information sharing and transparency among, and consults with UN 
subsidiaries, relevant states, outside organizations, and listed parties. Perhaps most significant is 
that the Team’s reports summarize litigation brought by individuals in regional and national 
courts that challenge the Regime, and have therefore, greatly contributed to the discussion of 
human rights in the context of the Sanctions Regime and marked improvements to the Regime.   
Such litigation commenced by individuals and parties grieved as a result of the 1267 
Sanctions Regime played a major role in altering the landscape of the Regime.  It forced relevant 
players in the Regime to recommend positive changes in order to avoid the risk that “sate 
criticism of the 1267 Committee [would] taint…[its] work, undermining global support for its 
objectives.”112  Al Barakaat International and Yassin Abdullah Kadi brought the most significant 
judicial challenges.  Al Barakaat argued that the Council of the European Union (“EU Council”) 
did not examine the underlying reasons for imposition of financial sanctions, thereby violating 
the claimant’s right to a fair trial.113  Kadi similarly argued that the EU Council and Commission 
of the European Communities violated his right to fair trial, as well as the principle of 
proportionality and his rights to property and judicial review, by imposing sanctions against him 
of which he could not challenge the evidentiary basis.114  In September 2005, the Court of First 
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Instance of the European Communities denied the claims, affirmed the sanctions, and upheld the 
superseding authority of the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers,115 reasoning that asset 
freezes did not violate fundamental rights or proportionality because they were precautionary, 
temporary, important to fighting terrorism, and permitted exemptions.116  The Court added that 
listed individuals were not due Security Council hearings as they could submit delisting through 
national authorities to forward to the Committee and that the court had already completely 
reviewed their claims.117  The court noted, however, that “courts could review Security Council 
decisions to ensure that they comply with internationally recognized fundamental norms of 
human rights from which neither Member States nor the United Nations may derogate.”118  The 
claimants appealed to the Court of Justice of the European Communities (“ECJ”).119  Though 
Kadi and Al Barakaat would carry on for years, their initial challenges set the precedent for 
regional and national judicial review of measures implemented by states to give effect to 
Security Council Resolutions pertaining to sanctions, and indirectly charged certain UN Security 
Council resolutions with violating fundamental rights.120  Their cases were the driving force 
behind many subsequent challenges that would combine to transform the Sanctions Regime. 
In another case, Ireland resident Chafiq Ayadi claimed that the EU Council misused its 
powers by freezing his assets, arguing that Security Council sanctions did not impose a duty on 
Member States to apply them.121  He further claimed that the sanctions violated principles of 
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subsidiarity and proportionality, as well as respect for human rights.122  UK resident Faraj 
Hassan challenged his asset freeze, claiming the EU Council’s violations of fundamental rights 
to property, family, privacy and a fair hearing, as well as the principle of proportionality.123  The 
Court of First Instance of the European Court of Justice dismissed their claims in 2006, 
upholding the sanctions, in part, on the availability of exemptions and delisting procedures.124  
However, the Court noted that national courts must afford listed individuals the opportunity to 
argue their case, must present their cases to the Sanctions Committee, may not refuse to do so 
based on lack of evidence due to confidentiality restrictions, and can be sued for their wrongful 
refusal. 125     
Nabil Sayadi and his wife Patricia Vinck, both officers of the European branch of Global 
Relief Foundation, who were listed as a result of the organization being listed, brought suit 
against Belgium to request that it seek their delisting by the UN and EU.126  In 2005, the Brussels 
Court of First Instance concluded that Brussels did not have jurisdiction over UN decisions and 
could only delist if the UN and EU had already done so.127  The court ultimately determined that 
the claimants only requested that Belgium submit a delisting request to the UN, and therefore, it 
obligated Belgium to comply as the couple had not been indicted since their 2003 listing.128  In 
December 2005, the criminal case and related investigation against the couple was dismissed by 
judicial decision.129  As of March 2006, the Sanctions Committee had not acted on Belgium’s 
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delisting petition,130 demonstrating that a national or regional merits-based review does not 
necessarily pressure the Sanctions Committee to act on a delisting request131.  These cases 
explicitly demonstrate that there was a need for a review mechanism in the Regime and that there 
were human rights issues that necessitated a complete inventory of the current Regime, which 
would come courtesy of Martin Scheinin, the first Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism.  Scheinin 
was appointed in 2005, some six years after the Sanctions Regime was first established and 
around the same time as the judicial challenges detailed above.  He served for eleven years until 
his replacement by Mr. Ben Emmerson on August 1, 2011.  Over the eleven years, these special 
rapporteurs worked with governments, UN bodies, outside agencies, and other relevant actors to 
gather information and make recommendations via periodic reports to the Human Rights Council 
and General Assembly concerning the human rights issues posed by the Sanctions Regime.  
Martin Scheinin’s 2006 report is among the most robust in its criticism of the 1267 Regime.  In 
that report, Scheinin highlighted the need for a uniform definition of terrorist acts, groups, and 
entities, as well as a clear pronouncement of what constitutes the link between a terrorist regime 
and terrorist act in order to be listed. 132   Such parameters would eliminate the varying 
interpretations of what it meant to be associated with, involved in, or provided support to a 
terrorist regime. 133  Scheinin also stressed the importance of conducting periodic reviews to 
ensure that listings remained temporary measures and that retained listings were based on an 
evidentiary finding that they remained necessary. 134  Such review prevents temporary sanctions 																																																								
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from becoming open-ended or permanent, and effectively, criminal punishment, the imposition 
of which would necessitate different procedures and standard of proof. 135  Scheinin’s report cited 
a number of procedural safeguards basic to operating the Regime in accordance with human 
rights, among them, the right to be informed of inclusion on the list and the grounds therefor, as 
such are prerequisites to availing oneself of the right to be heard on his or her case. 136  The right 
to be informed extends to apprising the listed of avenues for delisting and exemptions. 137  
Access to evidence is tantamount to appealing inclusion and should be provided even where 
evidence is classified through alternative means such as special counsel. 138  When suggesting 
that there be the right to judicial review at least by the states applying sanctions, as none was 
available at the international level, Scheinin made reference to the cases of Kadi and Al Barakaat 
to demonstrate that there has been judicial review at the national level.139  In the cases of 
wrongful listings, he proposed that a remedy such as restitution be made available to those 
affected.140  Finally, humanitarian exemptions to asset freezing must be available to sustain 
organizations existing to protect basic economic and social rights. 141 
The Security Council did not immediately address all of Scheinin’s 2006 report 
recommendations, but it did hear his calls, as well as the repeated calls of the regional and 
domestic courts involved in Kadi and Al Barakaat, Ayadi and Hassan, and Sayadi and Vinck, for 
an independent review or appeal mechanism.  Notably, the Security Council responded by 
adopting Resolution 1730 in December 2006, which created the Focal Point mechanism that 
would receive delisting requests and act as the liaison between Member States and the 1267 																																																								
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Committee.  The Focal Point would also keep the petitioner apprised of his/her listing status, a 
specific request made by Scheinin in his 2006 report.  Also passed that same month was 
Resolution 1735, directly responding to concerns raised by both Kadi and Ayadi, as well as 
Scheinin, over access to evidence – a prerequisite to both a sound defense and delisting request 
that was not afforded to the petitioners in Kadi and Ayadi.  Resolution 1735 required that listing 
proposals be submitted with a standardized cover sheet, a case statement with noted publicly 
releasable portions, and documentary or informational support that a proposed individual meets 
the listing criteria.  These requirements also somewhat satisfied Scheinin’s expressed desire for 
uniformity in what constitutes terrorist groups and sufficient links to terrorist acts.  Resolution 
1735 also reflected Scheinin’s advice to keep listings temporary through periodic review by 
incorporating, as criteria to be considered in delisting requests, whether the listed party no longer 
meets listing criteria, such that he/she is deceased or dissociated.  Resolution 1822, adopted in 
June 2008, went a step further in achieving Scheinin’s vision for periodic review by requiring 
annual review of all those listed to confirm that they still meet the criteria.  Resolution 1822 also 
made an additional stride towards achieving the access to information sought by the petitioners 
in Kadi and Ayadi, as well as by Rapporteur Scheinin, by calling for internet publishing of listing 
reason summaries. 
  Developments occurring post Resolution 1822 further contributed to the transformation 
of the Regime.  In August of 2008, Scheinin released another report, confirming that the 
Regime’s grave impact on certain due process rights resulting from indefinite asset freezing 
without a right to be delisted amounts to criminal punishment.142  It follows that certain 
minimum rights must be afforded throughout the listing process, such as the right to be informed 																																																								
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of the case, the right to a timely hearing and an independent review, the right to counsel, and the 
right to an effective remedy.143  If not provided at the UN level, Scheinin urged that there must 
be domestic judicial review.144   
Shortly thereafter, in September 2008, the ECJ issued its decision in the Kadi appeal, 
“arguably the most significant legal development to affect the regime since its inception,” which 
held that the EU had violated claimants’ rights to be heard and to effective judicial protection by 
withholding the evidentiary basis for the sanctions, thereby precluding their defense.145  The 
court further annulled the regulation that implemented the asset freeze against the claimants. 146 
Thereafter, the Committee’s listing reasons were communicated to the claimants, the claimants 
commented, and the European Commission reviewed those comments and enacted a new 
regulation to continue the sanctions against the claimants.147  The claimants again challenged the 
sanctions.148  Later in October 2008, the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal for England and 
Wales issued a decision in line with the ECJ’s in Kadi concerning a listed individual in which it 
held that the UK must conduct a merits-based review of listing reasons when the UK had 
designated the individual for listing.149   
Finally, in December 2008, the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) issued a decision on 
a complaint brought by Sayadi and Vinck while they awaited the Sanctions Committee’s 
decision on Belgium’s delisting request, in which the HRC concluded that Belgium had violated 
certain articles of the ICCPR, namely Article 12, which guarantees freedom of movement, and 
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Article 17, which guarantees the right to privacy that incorporates a right against attacks on 
honor and reputation.150  The HRC reasoned that travel restrictions were no longer justified upon 
conclusion of the investigation and after petitioners’ names and identifying information had been 
published in connection with terrorist sanctions.151  Sayadi and Vinck were finally delisted in 
2009 – a move that demonstrated “recognition of the Human Rights’ Committee’s ability to 
conduct indirect quasi-judicial review over the consequences of [Security Council] listing,” 
where a Member State to the ICCPR significantly contributed to said listing.152  Perhaps most 
importantly, the case illustrated that even though Belgium implemented sanctions measures in 
accordance with international law and the primacy of UN Security Council resolutions pursuant 
to UN Charter’s Article 103,153 and had submitted the delisting request when prompted, the HRC 
could still find it in violation of petitioners’ human rights, as it is Belgium’s obligation to strike a 
balance with their own obligations to international covenants and national constitutions.154  Here, 
Belgium’s submission of a delisting request indicated that the travel restrictions were no longer 
necessary, and though it may not have been within Belgium’s authority to remove petitioners 
from the list, it could have refrained from submitting their names to the Sanctions Committee 
before the outcome of the national investigation.155  “[The] decision was widely received as an 
authoritative and damning commentary on the inadequacy and illegitimacy of the UN 
blacklisting regime.”156 
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  By likening the sanctions to criminal penalties due to their severity, impact, and 
indefinite nature, Scheinin was effectively forcing a solution, given that criminal penalties 
necessitate human rights befitting of fair criminal process and review, if not at the UN level, then 
domestically, whereas temporary administrative measures do not necessarily.  The ECJ in Kadi 
found violations of certain due process rights and the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal for 
England and Wales followed the ECJ’S lead by confirming the existence of regional and national 
responsibility in providing merit-based reviews of listings.  Sayadi and Vinck demonstrated that 
the HRC could still find a Member State to be in violation of human rights, even where it 
rightfully follows the primacy of UN decisions, and therefore, the HRC acted as yet another form 
of review where one was absent at the UN level.  
  These challenges were reminiscent of those brought before the Focal Point had been 
instituted, demonstrating that the Regime continued to lack an adequate review mechanism 
despite the Focal Point’s implementation, which in turn, forced listed individuals to continue 
seeking alternative avenues for review.  The Focal Point’s relative failure in carrying out its 
mandate only strengthened the credence of the challenges.  Up until 2009, the Focal Point had 
received delisting requests for removal from the 1267 Sanctions List from 18 individuals 
granting only 3, and 22 entities, granting 17.157  The 1267 Committee delisted 2 individuals and 
2 entities in separate processes while the Focal Point review was still underway.158  In apparent 
response to the aforementioned, the Security Council passed Resolution 1904 in 2009, creating 
the Office of the Ombudsperson, which would independently and impartially review delisting 
requests through a 3-stage process incorporating information gathering, time limits, petitioner 
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involvement and notification, and collaboration with states and other UN bodies.  
In its current form, the Ombudsperson is tasked with receiving delisting requests from 
those on the 1267/1989/2253 Sanctions List.  Through Resolution, Member States are requested 
to urge individuals to submit their delisting requests first through the Ombudsperson prior to 
regional courts.  The Office of the Ombudsperson has procedurally improved and somewhat 
standardized the delisting process.  The delisting process takes place in three phases as discussed 
above, the information gathering stage, the dialogue and report stage, and finally, the committee 
discussion and decision.159  Delisting requests must be submitted with certain standardized 
information. 160   The Ombudsperson assesses the requests according to “whether there is 
sufficient information to provide a reasonable and credible basis for the listing.”161  The 
Ombudsperson devised this standard of review after considering the Security Council’s intention 
“that the [sanctions] measures…are preventative in nature and are not reliant upon criminal 
standards set out under national law,” 162 and concluding that the standard applicable in criminal 
proceedings is not appropriate as “sanctions are not intended to punish for criminal conduct. 
Rather, [they aim] to hamper access to resources in order to impede … and incapacitate threat[s] 
…and to encourage a change of conduct.”163  In assessing the information, the Ombudsperson 
must draw conclusions as to the petitioner’s association with and/or membership in the terrorist 
entities, the petitioner’s actions and/or acts of support, the petitioner’s dissociation, where 
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applicable, and the petitioner’s mental state.164  The mental element requirement to retain a 
listing need not be one of specific intent, rather, “when considering an individual’s acts of 
support,” it is sufficient that  “the individual knew or should have known” that his acts were in 
support.165 
The petitioner is kept apprised of the delisting request’s status throughout the process.166  
To date, there are 6 cases pending in the Ombudsperson’s Office, while 67 cases have already 
been considered.167  Of those 67, there have been 13 denials, 15 delistings, 1 withdrawal by 
petitioner, and 1 amended case.168  Some of these cases have more than one individual/entity 
involved.169  The timeline summaries and determinations of each case are available on the 
Ombudsperson Office’s website.170   The process, however, continues to lack transparency and 
certain fair procedures consistent with international human rights.  
The Ombudsperson’s Office has issued 12 reports since 2011, each detailing issues 
and/or impediments evident in the listing/delisting process, periodic improvements, and 
recommendations towards achieving a more transparent, just, and procedurally sound Regime.  
In its very first report, the Ombudsperson addressed the notion of due process, a notion that 
would be revisited in later reports.  Now, the Ombudsperson’s challenges to the Regime by way 
of its reports would accompany and intensify those of the Special Rapporteur, judicial, and 
quasi-judicial bodies.  However, the creation of Ombudsperson’s Office in and of itself as a 
																																																								
164 See “Approach to Analysis, Assessment and Use of Information | United Nations Security Council Subsidiary 
Organs.” UN News Center. UN. Web. 03 Oct. 2016. <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/ombudsperson/assessment-
information> 
165 “Approach to Analysis, Assessment and Use of Information | United Nations Security Council Subsidiary 
Organs.” 
166 See “Procedure | United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs.” 
167 See “Status of Cases | United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs.” UN News Center. UN. Web. 03 Oct. 
2016. <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sc/ombudsperson/status-of-cases> 
168 See “Status of Cases | United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs.”  
169 See “Status of Cases | United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs.”  
170 See “Status of Cases | United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs.”  
 38 
remedy to the lacking review mechanism did not eradicate all of the procedural pitfalls present in 
the Sanctions Regime prior to 2009. 
In a 2010 decision concerning the cases of Hani al-Sayyid al-Sebai and Mohammed al 
Ghabra, the Supreme Court of the UK, though welcoming the newly created Ombudsperson’s 
Office, determined it to be an insufficient judicial remedy thereby rendering the order 
implementing sanctions against al-Sebai and al Ghabra, ultra vires, or beyond the government’s 
authority.171 
  Scheinin’s next substantial report would also arrive in 2010.  In it, Scheinin expressed 
concern that Resolution 1390 transformed the Sanctions Regime from one that dealt in 
temporary emergency measures to address threats to peace and security to one that yields 
sanctions unlinked to territories, unlimited in time, and perhaps beyond the Security Council’s 
Chapter VII powers.172  Scheinin, like the UK Supreme Court in the al-Sebai and al Ghabra 
cases, found the Ombudsperson’s Office to be insufficient.  He opined that the Regime still 
lacked procedural fairness and an effective mechanism to challenge decisions that imposed 
indefinite asset freezes comparable to criminal penalties.173  The delisting scheme did not meet 
the requirements of “a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.”174  The Ombudsperson could not overturn the Committee’s listing decision, 
could not make its own recommendations, and its access to information was dependent on state 
willingness to disclose.175  The delisting process was confidential, lacked transparency with 
respect to providing the Ombudsperson’s report and other information to the petitioner, and the 																																																								
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decisions were politically determined by the Security Council rather than based in judicially 
reviewed evidence.176  Ultimately, the Ombudsperson could not qualify as a tribunal without 
having decision-making authority, and therefore, the Security Council was operating in a judicial 
or quasi-judicial capacity, yet lacked the fundamental procedures befitting of the right to fair trial 
as known to and practiced by other rights-abiding judicial and quasi-judicial institutions around 
the world.177  In this respect, the Security Council’s imposition of sanctions, Scheinin concluded, 
exceeded its Chapter VII powers.178  Scheinin cited both the HRC’s decision in Sayadi and Vinck 
and the ECJ’s decision in Kadi to support the notion of “indirect review” over Security Council 
decisions and make the point that states should implement sanctions “not blindly, but subject to 
adequate human rights guarantees.”179  
Scheinin released another report in 2010, reiterating his concern that the Sanctions 
Regime exceeds the Security Council’s powers and calling for a paradigm whereby Member 
States would accomplish listings through sound procedures compatible with their own legal 
systems, while still accepting the UN’s advice and assistance.180  He explained that the best 
practice in any terrorist listing regime would incorporate the following elements: (1) requirement 
that listing be based on “reasonable grounds” that the listed “knowingly carried out, participated 
in or facilitated a terrorist act”; (2) a right to be informed of inclusion on the list, the grounds 
therefore and the consequences thereof; (3) an avenue to request a delisting and to appeal 
decision to retain the listing that incorporates due process standards and appropriate burdens of 
proof; (4) an opportunity to reapply for delisting upon a change in circumstance or new 																																																								
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evidence; (5) auto-cessation of listings and sanctions after 12 months absent a determination that 
the individual/entity still meets the listing criteria; and (6) a remedy for those wrongfully 
affected.181 
The Kadi case reappeared in 2010 when the General Court of the European Union 
(“EGC”) issued a decision on Kadi’s last challenge, in which the court confirmed the ECJ’s 
previous finding that Kadi had been deprived access to evidence and the EU had merely adopted 
the Committee’s “vague” and “unsubstantiated” summary of listing reasons, precluding effective 
legal review.182  Therefore, Kadi’s fundamental rights to a defense, judicial review, and property 
had been violated.183  Notwithstanding its confirmation of the ECJ’s ruling, the EGC recited 
certain criticisms in its rationale, specifically that the Sanctions Regime would be “disrupted” 
and the Security Council’s powers “encroached” by national or regional review, and that such 
review may be inconsistent with international law.184  Yet, the EGC determined that such review 
was justified in light of “the draconian nature and long-lasting effects of fund-freezing measures 
on fundamental rights.”185   
The effectiveness of the review, however, relies on the court’s ability to establish whether 
the evidence underpinning the sanctions is “factually accurate, reliable and consistent,” whether 
it “contains all the [necessary] relevant information,” and “whether it is capable of substantiating 
the conclusions drawn from it.” 186   Confidentiality restrictions on state-held information 
encumber effective review, leaving decisions to be based on empty allegations and undisclosed 
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intelligence shared only between Member States.187  Thus, the dilemma extends beyond mere EU 
cooperation with courts, as neither the EU nor the Sanctions Committee has unfettered access to 
evidence.188 
In January 2011, the Ombudsperson, Kimberly Prost, issued her first report, expressing 
concern over issues of transparency and fair process, such as the insufficiency of certain 
information shared by states regarding the petitioners, and the Committee’s lack of obligation to 
communicate its delisting decisions making precedent-setting difficult.189  Additionally, states 
were under no obligation to disclose whether they had designated parties for listing, impeding a 
petitioner’s ability to respond to the case.190  The Ombudsperson also found problematic 
circumstances in which delisted individuals and individuals with similar names to those listed 
experienced misapplied sanctions, and therefore, suggested an expansion in its mandate to 
examine these matters.191  Finally, Prost thought it logical for the Ombudsperson to be authorized 
to notify individuals of their delisting in cases where the Committee made the determination 
without the Ombudsperson’s involvement, rather than only being permitted to do so in cases 
where the Ombudsperson had a role.192   
The aforementioned challenges, centered mainly on the need for an effective review 
mechanism and increased access to evidence and information, gained enough momentum to 
garner another reaction by the Security Council, expressed through Resolutions 1988 and 1989.  
Resolution 1989, in particular, called for the Ombudsperson to make recommendations on 
delisting cases that could only be overlooked through Committee consensus or Security Council 																																																								
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decision. 193   This strengthened the Ombudsperson’s authority to act independently and 
minimized the Security Council’s review of its decisions, a direct response to Scheinin’s position 
that the Ombudsperson lacked decision making power and the court’s view in the al-Sebai and al 
Ghabra case that the Ombudsperson was yet an insufficient judicial remedy.  Furthermore, 
Resolution 1989 provided that the Ombudsperson’s recommendation to delist would “trigger” 
cessation of sanctions 60 days after the Committee completed consideration of the 
recommendation, absent consensus opposition or referral to the Security Council.194  This again 
enhanced the Ombudsperson’s authority by giving its decisions force of application absent 
opposing action.  Moreover, the “triggering” mechanism, coupled with Resolution 1989’s two 
month extension of the information gathering stage195 and obligation that the Ombudsperson 
abide by certain confidentiality restrictions on state-provided information,196 could be seen as a 
corrective measures to the issues of states’ reluctance to provide information and petitioners’ 
bridled access to evidentiary support underpinning listing decisions – matters that somewhat took 
center stage in the Ombudsperson’s first report, Scheinin’s 2010 reports, and even the Kadi case.  
Along the same lines of furthering transparency, Resolution 1989 imposed a duty on the 
Committee to provide reasons for its denials to petitioners197 and urged designating states to 
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disclose their identities,198 as both are necessary to inform the petitioners so that they may 
prepare a defense. 
It should be noted that the most significant change stemming from Resolutions 1988 and 
1989 was the division of the 1267 Sanctions List and overseeing Committee into two distinct 
lists with separate committees.  After the division, the 1267 Sanctions Regime would only cover 
Al-Qaeda, while the 1988 Sanctions would cover the Taliban.  Taliban delisting petitions would 
therefore be submitted directly to the 1988 Committee by Member States, or to the Focal Point in 
cases where individuals were submitting on their own behalf, while the Ombudsperson would 
only accept delisting petitions pertaining to the Al-Qaeda Sanctions list.  This comprehensive 
division, rather than resulting from the challenges mentioned above, was purportedly a political 
move meant to defer authority over the Taliban to the Afghan government in furtherance of that 
government’s peace efforts with the Taliban.199  The Afghan Ambassador thought the change 
would “have a psychological effect on Taliban members considering laying down arms,” while 
U.S. Ambassador, Susan Rice, believed it would send “a clear message to the Taliban that there 
is a future for those who separate from Al Qaida, renounce violence and abide by the Afghan 
constitution.”200  In sum, the move would transfer more authority to the Afghan government over 
its own people.201  Consequently, and as stated above, the 1988 Sanctions Regime, pursuant to 
Resolution 1988, encouraged consultation and cooperation with, and required listing notification 
to, the Government of Afghanistan, the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan, and/or the UN 
Assistance Missions in Afghanistan.  Furthermore, the 1988 Sanctions Regime considered for 
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delisting those who “reconciled” in accordance with the Kabul Conference principles202 in that 
they had broken ties with terrorism, renounced violence, and respected the Constitution203.  
Some seven years after the commencement of the first judicial challenge brought by Kadi 
and Al Barakaat, and four years after the ECJ’s pivotal decision in that case, the European Court 
of Human Rights (“ECHR”) issued a decision in a challenge brought by Youssef Nada against 
the Swiss prosecutor’s office that demonstrated the ever-enduring nature and extensive 
application of the Kadi decision. Nada had been listed and his assets frozen in 2001 due to 
suspicious links to terrorist organizations. 204  In 2005, Nada requested that the investigation 
against him be dropped.205  Upon the court’s order that criminal charges be brought or the case 
dropped, the authorities dropped the case for lack of evidence.206  Nada continued to file federal 
judicial challenges and appeals for removal from the UN Consolidated list, but the federal 
authorities rejected his efforts, citing the binding authority of Security Council decisions and lack 
of Swiss authority to submit delisting petitions on behalf of non-residents.207  Nada finally 
brought his case to the ECHR, claiming violation of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ Article 6 guarantee to fair trial.208  In September 2012, in 
keeping with the ECJ’s decision in Kadi, the ECHR determined that Nada had been deprived of 
an effective avenue to challenge the sanctions against him.209  The Nada decision was far-																																																								
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reaching, applying to some 47 states in the Council of Europe.210  Significantly, years after Kadi 
began, and after the establishment of the Focal Point and the later Ombudsperson’s Office, listed 
parties were still resorting to national and regional judiciaries to challenge their sanctions, 
demonstrating that an independent, impartial, and effective judicial review mechanism was still 
lacking in the Sanctions Regime.   
Another reverberating defect in the Regime that was not solved by Resolution was a 
petitioner’s lack of access to evidence.  Al-Haramain Foundation brought suit in a U.S. Federal 
Court, arguing that U.S. imposition of sanctions violated due process because the listing was 
based on classified information and other information not provided to the claimant.211  The 
claimant also argued violation of its right against unreasonable search and seizure, among other 
violations.212  The court decided in favor of the government in 2008.213  In 2011, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s determination that the designation was proper, 
but found violations of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment due process rights deemed 
harmless error.214  The case was remanded for Fourth Amendment violations because the 
government had not obtained a judicial warrant prior to the designation, but this too was deemed 
harmless in a December 2012 decision.215  Though the violations of due process and search and 
seizure were found to be harmless, they were violations nonetheless, and spoke to the continued 
inadequacy of the Regime well after creation of the Ombudsperson’s Office.   
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Following these judicial decisions, Martin Scheinin’s successor, Ben Emmerson, issued a 
2012 report that offered an in depth review of the Ombudsperson’s Office as it operates in the 
Al-Qaeda Regime, particularly with respect to its compatibility with human rights.  He expanded 
on certain judicial decisions concerning the Regime’s inadequacy of judicial review and 
restrained access to evidence, making particular reference to the Sayadi, Nada and Kadi cases.  
Rather than adopting Scheinin’s position that domestic judicial oversight must be in place absent 
independent review at the UN level, Emmerson was of the view that domestic judicial review is 
inadequate as it creates a scenario where the petitioner lacks access to evidence because it is 
unavailable to the court or because the court is unauthorized to provide it.216  Furthermore, 
though the Ombudsperson was armed with more decision making power via its 
recommendations that would automatically take effect absent Committee or Security Council 
action, the Committee or Security Council could still effectuate a different result.  Citing an 
ECHR holding, Emmerson submitted, “that a requirement for quasi-judicial determinations to be 
ratified by an executive body with power to vary or rescind it contravenes the ‘very notion’ of an 
independent tribunal.”217  When state listing proposals are adopted absent Committee objection, 
they are typically only subject to designating state review of the underlying evidence which can 
be tainted with diplomatic negotiations and selectively disclosed information while lacking any 
obligation to disclose exculpatory information.218  The risk here is that the Regime will be used 
as a political tool.219  
The scheme, as it was, obligated states, pursuant to the UN Charter, to impose open-
ended sanctions without independent judicial review, despite any other human rights obligations 																																																								
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those states may have had pursuant to treaty or covenant.220  As a political body, the Security 
Council was to issue only temporary measures intended to thwart imminent threats to 
international peace and security, yet was carrying out law enforcement, legislative, judicial and 
even executive functions without the strictures typically associated with human rights-abiding 
legal systems.221  Emmerson therefore suggested transforming the Ombudsperson’s Office into 
that of an “independent designations adjudicator” with the authority “to review and overturn” 
Committee decisions, preside over exemption requests, and issue final decisions, unreviewable 
by the Committee or Security Council.222 
Emmerson had additional criticisms.  The “associated with” listing criteria left too much 
room for judgment and the listing narrative summaries lacked sufficient evidentiary detail.223 
Confidential information not provided to the Ombudsperson could not be prevented from 
otherwise making its way into the process, and therefore, should be released to Ombudsperson 
on the condition of confidentiality. 224  Lawyers, petitioners, and at times, the Ombudsperson, 
were left in the dark with respect to information underlying delisting requests, and thus, 
Emmerson recommended that the Ombudsperson inform petitioners and the public of its 
decisions, and that the Committee too provide its reasons for delisting and retention alike to both 
petitioners and the public.225 
Emmerson’s other recommended changes to the regime included eliminating the 
requirement of obtaining consent prior to disclosing designating state identities, excluding 
information obtained via torture, obligating release of exculpatory information, implementing 
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time limits on designations, providing funded legal representation for indigent individuals, and 
allowing for translation services to enable communications in petitioner’s language.226   
The Ombudsperson’s second, third and fourth reports reflected the same defects as those 
in Emmerson’s 2012 report and the judicial decisions up until 2012, such that they expressed 
dissatisfaction with the absence of transparency in the Regime, as well as the parameters of the 
Ombudsperson’s mandate.  States remained reluctant to provide confidential and classified 
information concerning the petitioner, and the information states did share was untimely and 
lacked specificity.227  Disclosing designating state identities remained problematic, and as such, 
the Ombudsperson requested that the requirement to obtain state permission prior to disclosure 
of its identity be eliminated.228  To further improve transparency in information and evidence, the 
Ombudsperson suggested that the Committee provide decisions to the Ombudsperson, who 
would then provide it to the petitioners.229  The Ombudsperson also recommended that she be 
authorized to disclose to petitioner and interested states, upon the Committee’s completion of 
case review, the comprehensive report, including how a decision was attained, whether that be 
through the Ombudsperson’s recommendation, Committee consensus, or Security Council 
vote.230  These measures, if implemented, also would have somewhat expanded the role of the 
Ombudsperson by giving her greater flexibility to share information freely.  Additionally, the 
Ombudsperson explicitly sought greater authority by requesting an expansion in mandate to 
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address wrongfully applied sanctions, transmit exemption requests to the Committee, and request 
exemptions itself when necessary for petitioner interviews.231 
The ECHR’s 2012 decision in Nada, the U.S. courts’ holdings in Al-Haramain, 
Emmerson’s comprehensive 2012 report, and the Ombudsperson’s second, third and fourth 
reports all served to bring attention to the power struggle between the Security Council and the 
Ombudsperson’s Office, the insufficiency of both the Ombudsperson’s Office and 
domestic/national courts as judicial review mechanisms, and the transparency issues related to 
evidence that stymied the petitioner’s rights to be informed, to prepare a case, to be heard, and to 
be judicially reviewed.  The Security Council was once again compelled to deliver 
improvements.  
Resolution 2083 responded to the ongoing transparency concerns in a number of ways 
that worked to better standardize the Regime’s information sharing and eliminate evidentiary 
speculation and the potential misuse of the Regime as a political tool.  The Resolution required 
listing requests to be submitted using a standard form in place of the cover sheet once required 
by Resolution 1735, and also required a publicly releasable case statement incorporating 
underlying reasons for the request.232  Absent specific objection, disclosure of designating state 
identities became permissible.233  Translation services were called for.234  The Resolution further 
urged information sharing among Member States, relevant organizations, the Committee, and 
Monitoring Team in an effort to keep the listing summaries accurate and promote proper 
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decision making on the requests.235  The Ombudsperson became authorized to disseminate 
information related to the stage reached in the process and its recommendation to the petitioner 
and relevant and/or interested states, while the Committee was to communicate the rationale for 
its decisions to the petitioner.236  Again, the expansion in Ombudsperson’s mandate not only 
increased transparency, but also acted as a step towards delegating greater powers to the 
Ombudsperson.  It was not the only step provided for in Resolution 2083 that would advance the 
Ombudsperson’s role in the Sanctions Regime.  
The Ombudsperson could now seek travel ban exemptions on behalf of petitioners to 
facilitate interviews necessary for the delisting process, though it still could not preside over 
exemption requests itself.237  Rather, the Focal Point would respond to exemption requests after 
they were first submitted to the petitioner’s state of residence – a requirement the Ombudsperson 
then recommended removing.238  More importantly, the Ombudsperson’s recommendations to 
delist or retain would stand, absent Committee action through its now shortened review and 
consideration stages of 15 and 30 days, respectively. 239  
By this point, onus of ardently criticizing began shifting to the Ombudsperson, whereas 
before, the challenges against the Regime more prevalently appeared through judicial decisions 
and Special Rapporteur reports.  The Ombudsperson’s fifth through seventh reports expressed 
ongoing issues, highlighted certain improvements made from one report to the next, and raised 
some new issues.  Overall, the timeliness of information supplied by states concerning the 
petitioner somewhat improved by the sixth and seventh reports, but specificity of the state-																																																								
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supplied supporting evidence remained lacking in all three reports.240  States were mainly 
reluctant to supply specific evidence due to its classified or confidential information.241  Recall 
that Emmerson too believed that narrative summaries lacked detail and feared that classified 
information, despite being withheld from the Ombudsperson, could still unfairly infiltrate the 
decision-making process.242  He therefore recommended releasing classified information to the 
Ombudsperson on the condition of confidentiality.243  Positively, states began entering into 
agreements with the Ombudsperson, whereby the state would supply the necessary information 
on the condition that the Ombudsperson would be bound to maintain its confidentiality.244  The 
improved timeliness of state-supplied information and the advent of confidentiality agreements 
entered into between states and the Ombudsperson could be traced back to the combined result 
of Resolution 1989’s “triggering” mechanism,245  two month extension of the information 
gathering stage, 246  and obligation that the Ombudsperson abide by certain confidentiality 
restrictions on state-provided information247 .  The Security Council, in Resolution 2083, 
welcomed the confidentiality arrangements being entered into.248  By the Ombudsperson’s eighth 
report, Resolution 2161 had been passed, giving the Ombudsperson discretion to abbreviate the 
information-gathering stage where there was no objection to delisting, likely as a result of the 
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ever-increasing cooperation of states in supplying information. 249   However, as of the 
Ombudsperson’s most recent 2016 report, there is no indication that the Regime has completely 
overcome the hurdle confidentiality restrictions pose to accessing information,250 neither has 
there been any signal that the Security Council will adopt a more forceful resolution requiring 
states to provide classified information or enter into agreements with the Ombudsperson. 
The Ombudsperson’s reports also cited ongoing delays in the Committee’s 
communication of the reasons behind its decisions to petitioners.251  To remedy these delays, the 
Ombudsperson suggested imposing time constraints or being responsible herself to communicate 
reasons to the petitioner when the decision was based on the Ombudsperson’s recommendation, 
while leaving the Committee and Security Council to communicate the reasons when they were 
responsible for the final determination through, for example, Committee reversal or Security 
Council decision. 252   In addition to perhaps resolving the delays in communication, the 
Ombudsperson believed this plan would be fairer as the reasons given would reflect the decision-
maker’s analysis.253  The Security Council reacted to these delays, the Ombudsperson’s request 
for remediation in Resolution 2161, when it imposed a 60-day limit during which the Committee 
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was obligated to communicate reasons for its decisions.254  Such a provision was indeed 
reflective of Emmerson’s position in his 2012 report that “[a]s a ‘core irreducible minimum’ the 
individual must be provided with sufficient information to enable him or her to give an effective 
answer to the allegations.”255  The content of the Committee’s communications concerning its 
decision-making slowly improved over the course of the Ombudsperson’s ninth through twelfth 
reports,256 with her twelfth report promisingly stating “[t]he Committee’s consistency and 
reliability in transmitting extensive reasons to petitioners are a major step towards making the 
process more transparent and fair.”257  Her expressed hope that the “positive trend” continues,258 
however, signifies that the problem, at least in part, remains. 
Throughout reports five through seven, the Ombudsperson directed attention to 
transparency issues beyond the Committee’s communication of its reasoning to petitioners.  The 
petitioner and relevant or requesting states lacked access to the comprehensive report, the 
petitioner was not privy to the Ombudsperson’s recommendation and analysis, and the public 
was uninformed of nearly everything save for general procedural information and case 
statistics.259  These transparency issues surrounding access to evidence were not new, of course.  
As evident above, they had been around, and in fact, brought up more generally in past judicial 
challenges and Special Rapporteur reports.  Now, however, with the help of the Ombudsperson 
and the new Rapporteur, the more general issue of access to evidence was broken down into 
specifics.  Emmerson too had mentioned that petitioners, their lawyers, and even the 																																																								
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Ombudsperson, at times, are left speculating over supporting evidence, and thus, the 
Ombudsperson and the Committee should better inform the petitioners and the public of its 
decisions and the reasons therefore.260  By specifying the areas where improvement was needed, 
for example, with regards to the Committee’s communication of reasons for decisions, the 
Ombudsperson’s comprehensive reports, and confidentiality restrictions on state-supplied 
information, the Security Council was better able to devise solutions that would in turn address 
the more general defect, transparency in evidence, as a whole.  The challenges were becoming 
more nuanced and the Regime, via Resolutions, was becoming more sophisticated.  Prior to the 
Ombudsperson’s eighth report, Resolution 2161 had been adopted, allowing the Ombudsperson 
to provide the comprehensive report to interested states after Committee approval and 
appropriate redactions.261  The Ombudsperson, however, was not satisfied, believing that the 
Resolution failed to provide for delivery of the Comprehensive Report, the Ombudsperson’s 
reasons and analyses, to the petitioner and the public, and therefore, she has continued to request 
greater access for the same in her reports to date.262  The Ombudsperson’s website now offers a 
window into the rationale of decision making by communicating how certain information is used 
and analyzed to reach determinations concerning association with or dissociation from terrorist 
groups, the mental element required for acts of support and appropriateness of inferences, but 
nevertheless, it is far from comprehensive.263  
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The Ombudsperson’s fifth through seventh reports, like those before, continued to bring 
light to misapplied sanctions that extended beyond listings.264  Finally, the Security Council 
responded through Resolution 2161 when it authorized the Focal Point to receive and submit to 
the Committee, for a response within 60 days, communications from individuals claiming 
wrongfully applied sanctions.265  Though the Ombudsperson appreciated the effort, she remained 
wary.  She cloaked what seemed to be her attempt at securing more independence and authority 
over the Focal Point’s responsibilities in a more pragmatic argument.  Pointing to already 
existing deficiencies in the Focal Point exemption request schema, the Ombudsperson suggested 
that the use of separate avenues in the same regime to accomplish similar tasks, here specifically, 
the Focal Point and Ombudsperson’s Office, would result in confusion and overlap.266  The 
Ombudsperson’s argument was strengthened by the Focal Point’s relative failure compared with 
the Ombudsperson’s success.  In theory, the Focal Point was to improve the Sanctions Regime, 
serving as an avenue for individuals on the 1988 Sanctions List to request delisting and for 
individuals on the 1267/1989/2253 Sanctions List to requests exemptions from sanctions. To 
date, the Focal Point has received a total of 3 requests from individuals seeking removal from the 
1988 Sanctions List.267  While the Focal Point has not granted any of the requests, the Committee 
has delisted 1 of these individuals through a separate process.268  Additionally, the Focal Point 
received its first travel ban exemption request from an individual on the 1267/1989/2253 
Sanctions List in 2013, but denied the request.269  In 2015, the Focal Point similarly received and 
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denied two travel ban requests from individuals on the 1267/1989/2253 Sanctions List.270 The 
details of these requests and their denials are unknown but for the Focal Point merely stating in 
one of its informal annual reports that the denial of two of the three exemption requests was due 
to the destination state’s lack of agreement.271  The informal annual reports offered no further 
information beyond basic statistical information.272  Despite the Ombudsperson’s repeated 
efforts to secure control over exemptions and misapplied sanctions, the Focal Point remains in 
charge of these responsibilities.273  
Along the same lines of misapplied sanctions to individuals no longer listed or to 
mistaken individuals were those names that remained on the list longer than necessary.  
Emmerson’s proposed solution was to institute a time limit on designations. 274   The 
Ombudsperson suggested an upgrade to the Committee’s yearly review of names that had not 
been reviewed in three years – a review already in place pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
1822. 275   The upgrade would provide for Committee referral to the Ombudsperson for 
information gathering those cases in which states neither objected to nor supported delisting, or 
where information was insufficient.276  The Ombudsperson believed this would “strengthen the 
effectiveness of the review process.”277 
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In her eighth report, the Ombudsperson reframed the judicial review mechanism issue.  
She would continue to build upon it until her most recent 2016 report.  Of course, the issue was 
an old one, having been present since the early days of Kadi.  Indeed, Emmerson’s 2012 report 
suggested that the conflict between the Security Council’s authority and Ombudsperson’s review 
necessitated transforming the latter into an “independent designations adjudicator.”278  In her 
seventh report published in January 2014, the Ombudsperson foreshadowed the in-depth review 
of the Office’s independence and autonomy that she would conduct in later reports when she 
detailed an influential decision by the Secretariat.  The Secretariat determined that any person 
travelling with the Ombudsperson in fulfillment of the latter’s mandate must submit a report.279  
The conflict here was that at times, the Legal Officer would often assist the Ombudsperson, 
specifically with petitioner interviews.280  Therefore, any report the Legal Officer submitted to 
the Secretariat, an executive arm of the UN, concerning the Ombudsperson’s mandated duties 
would “represent a direct and significant incursion into the independence of the Office.”281  
Seemingly a result of the Ombudsperson’s representation of the Secretariat’s decision, 
Resolution 2161, adopted in June 2014, when mentioning the mandate of the Ombudsperson 
stated that the Office should “carry out its mandate in an independent, effective and timely 
manner.”282  In her eighth report, the Ombudsperson characterized the Security Council’s 
addition of the term “independent” in describing the Ombudsperson’s mandate, as somewhat of 
an intentional emphasis.283  Prost offered a deeper analysis of the minutiae underlying the 
Ombudsperson’s lack of authority in her eighth and coming reports in which she cited to 
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logistical impediments to the independence and autonomy envisioned by the mandate that gave 
birth to the Office.  More specifically, the Ombudsperson’s consultancy contract prevents it 
from self-managing its budget, resources, and staffing.284  Worse yet, the Office does not 
actually have its own budget and certification of its performance falls under the direction of a 
division related to the Sanctions Regime.285  Furthermore, the Office lacks sole responsibility 
and authority for its travel to interview petitioners and over access to its information.286  Yet in 
the same report citing these issues, the Ombudsperson boldly, but prematurely, asserted that the 
Ombudsperson mechanism was one “designed by the Council [that] provides for an independent 
review process that comports with the principles of fairness and is able to deliver an effective 
remedy.”287  The Ombudsperson continued that the practice of imposing sanctions under this 
regime “comports with fundamental human rights principles and international law as envisaged 
in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations.”288     
If this was the case, however, the Security Council would not have sought to force a cure 
for the Office’s lack of independence through Resolution 2253, in which it requested that the 
Secretary-General provide the Security Council with an update in six months on steps taken to 
ensure that the Ombudsperson operates “in an independent, effective and timely manner.”289  As 
of the twelfth and last report, the Ombudsperson had discussed various options with the Security 
Council Affairs Division on how to best achieve this aim and agreed with the Secretariat’s 
proposal that the Ombudsperson’s office “be established as a stand-alone special political 
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mission with a dedicated budget.”290  The success of implementing this new structure remains to 
be seen.   
Certainly, the timing of and interplay among the judicial challenges, Special Rapporteur 
reports, Ombudsperson’s reports, and Security Council resolutions, demonstrate that the 
challenges were the driving force behind subsequent remedial Security Council resolutions.  
Arguably, the Security Council would not have adopted such resolutions had it legitimately 
believed it was acting within its authority by issuing preventative temporary administrative 
sanctions that did not demand adjudicatory procedures consistent with internationally recognized 
human rights. 
“While the Security Council has assumed a judicial or quasi-judicial role in imposing 
sanctions on individuals and entities under the 1267 sanctions regime, its procedures continue to 
fall short of guaranteeing due-process related rights for individuals suspected of terrorism.”291  
Though some of the human rights violations have been addressed, others persist.  Significantly, 
petitioners and their lawyers are still denied access to crucial determinations concerning their 
listing status and factual evidence used to come to those determinations.  States are still under no 
obligation to disclose their identities as designating states, nor are they required to release 
evidence deemed confidential, yet this evidence cannot technically be withheld from making its 
way into the decision to list the individual.  The public has no access at all to anything other than 
basic statistics.  Finally, the Ombudsperson’s Office has not yet achieved the autonomy and 
independence called for by its mandate, leaving the Regime lacking of the fundamental right to 
effective judicial review.  Professor of International Relations Rosemary Foot quoted a 2005 
report by Robert K. Goldman, then UN independent expert on the protection of human rights and 																																																								
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fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, in which he stated that “no relevant Security 
Council resolution establishes precise legal standards governing the inclusion of persons and 
groups on lists or the freezing of assets, much less mandates safeguards or legal remedies to 
those mistakenly or wrongfully included on these lists.”292  Startlingly, this statement is no less 
true today than it was in 2005. 
As mentioned above, the Security Council and Ombudsperson maintain that the sanctions 
measures are preventative, not punitive, of criminal behavior, and therefore, national and 
international criminal standards, which would include effective judicial review, are inapplicable 
to the Sanctions Regime.  Their reports and resolutions, however, indicate otherwise, such that if 
their position was sound, these mechanisms would neither have continuously challenged the 
Regime nor remedied any of the challenges discussed above through resolutions in an effort to 
make the Regime more, fair, transparent, and consistent with internationally recognized due 
process standards.  Their position is therefore more in line with that of the Special Rapporteur, 
who proceeds from the view that the indefinite nature of sanctions and their consequences on 
those upon which they are imposed makes them akin to criminal charges, thereby requiring a 
procedure consistent with the due process, evidentiary and transparency standards befitting of an 
international human rights-compatible judicial regime. 
The question then becomes, are the sanctions akin to criminal penalties so as to warrant 
the fundamental human rights standards befitting of a criminal adjudicatory process? If so, is the 
UN, as an international organization and not a Member State, obligated to enforce these rules?  
Criminal Penalties and UN Obligations  
The Human Rights Committee, in Comment No. 32, explained that the right to a fair trial 																																																								
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pursuant to the ICCPR’s Article 14 is guaranteed in “cases regarding the determination of 
criminal charges.”293  The Committee defined criminal charges as those that “relate in principle 
to acts declared to be punishable under domestic criminal law [or] to acts that are criminal in 
nature with sanctions that, regardless of their qualification in domestic law, must be regarded as 
penal because of their purpose, character or severity.” 294  
In the Kadi case, the General Court’s Seventh Chamber determined, after 10 years of 
Kadi’s assets being frozen, that it was time to call into question the court’s previous judgment 
that the freeze was a “temporary precautionary measure which, unlike confiscation, does not 
affect the very substance of the right of the persons concerned to property in their financial assets 
but only the use thereof.”295  The court went on to state that “[i]n the scale of a human life, 10 
years in fact represent a substantial period of time and the question of the classification of the 
measures in question as preventative or punitive, protective or confiscatory, civil or criminal 
seems now to be an open one.”296   The court also referred to a 2009 report by the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in which the Commissioner took a similar position when it 
suggested that the open ended nature of listings causes the temporary asset freeze to become 
permanent, and therefore, severe enough to constitute criminal punishment. 297   The 
Commissioner went on to offer that decisions resulting in criminal punishment should either be 
judicially made or judicially reviewed.298 
The Sanctions Monitoring Team in its Ninth Report suggested that the Sanctions 
Committee do more to make certain that the sanctions “do not rise to the level of the deprivations 																																																								
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of life, liberty and property that can result from criminal conviction under national 
jurisdiction,”299 – a statement that indirectly indicated the Monitoring Team’s view that the 
sanctions were criminal in nature. 
In his 2012 Report on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ben Emmerson, concluded that although the 1267 
sanctions are intended as “preventative and deterrent,” their “indeterminate nature” coupled with 
their severity “gives them the colour of a penal sanction.”300  In justifying his position, 
Emmerson cited to the Human Rights Committee’s observation “that certain measures must be 
regarded as penal, regardless of their formal classification, because of their ‘character or 
severity’.”301  Emmerson additionally referred to the European Court of Human Rights’ position 
“that preventative and deterrent objectives ‘may be seen as constituent elements in the very 
notion of punishment’.”302  He further pointed to the General Court of the European Union’s 
reflection in Kadi,303 as mentioned above.  In short, Emmerson adopted the opinion that the 
sanctions are “drastic and oppressive” and “paralyzing.”304 
In determining whether a criminal charge exists, the European Court of Human Rights 
looks at: “1) the state legal system’s categorization of the offense; 2) the nature of the offense 
and penalty; 3) the severity of the penalty.”305  The Security Council determined that the act of 																																																								
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financing terrorism is criminal in nature.306  However, the sanctions are intended to prevent 
terrorist financing, and therefore, can be considered protective. 307   The sanctions are 
disproportionate in that they implement freezes on “all assets regardless of … amount or [the 
target’s] relative culpability.”308  They are severe and “undeniabl[y] punitive” in that they 
“stigmatize” individuals as terrorists, resulting in the “loss of livelihood” and other “dire 
economic consequences.”309  
In summary, the indefinite time, which individuals and entities are listed, and therefore, 
subject to sanctions; the severity of the measures imposed such as asset bans and travel freezes; 
and their societal and economic consequences, make the sanctions akin to criminal penalties.310  
It follows that due process rights must be afforded to the individuals and entities subject to these 
“pseudo” criminal penalties in the determination of whether to institute or remove the sanctions 
against them, or innocent people may be made to suffer without redress.311  But is the UN 
obligated to provide these guarantees? 
Though due process rights are now standard guarantees in human rights instruments, 
constitutions, and statutes that apply to many states, the obligations of states arising from these 
aforementioned instruments may not apply to the UN as a non-party and “autonomous subject of 
international law.”312  Moreover, the UN is not obligated to these instruments merely as a result 
of its constituents’ obligations.313  Additionally, customary international law is not exactly clear 
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on international/intergovernmental organizations’ commitments to guaranteeing due process 
rights to individuals; however, the trend is moving towards placing obligations on international 
organizations to uphold due process rights when “exercise[ing] governmental authority over 
individuals.”314   
In fact, the drafters of the UDHR incorporated language broad enough to guarantee the 
rights encompassed therein to individuals even by international organizations carrying out 
official actions.315  For example, the UDHR guarantees rights to everyone, but does not specify 
limitations on who or what must provide said rights, advancing the principle that the rights must 
be guaranteed to individuals, no matter whether by their state, another state, national, or 
international organs.  The UDHR explicitly states that human rights should be protected by the 
“rule of law”, considered by “every organ of society”, ensured through “national and 
international [measures]” and a conducive “social and international order”.316  The 1993 World 
Conference on Human Rights declared the promotion and protection of human rights to be “a 
matter of priority” for both the UN and the entirety of the international community, while the 
Vienna Declaration confirmed a need “for States and international organizations … to create 
favourable conditions at the national, regional and international levels to ensure the full and 
effective enjoyment of human rights.”317 
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Finally, the UN Charter is the constitution of the UN, and therefore, all UN organs “when 
exercising the functions assigned to them, [must] respect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of individuals to the greatest possible extent.”318 
The Human Rights Committee has shed light on this issue.  In the Sayadi and Vinck case 
before the Human Rights Committee, Belgium argued, in part, that listing individuals could not 
violate certain human rights because listing was an administrative measure, not a criminal 
sanction. 319  The Committee obviously did not find this line of argument persuasive when it 
concluded that Belgium had violated Articles 12 and 17 of the ICCPR.320  In Perterer v. Austria, 
a municipal employee brought a complaint to the Human Rights Committee alleging violation of 
ICCPR Article 14’s fair trial rights resulting from a disciplinary complaint brought against him 
in the Disciplinary Commission for Employees of Municipalities of the Province of Salzburg.321  
The Committee recognized that disciplinary measures imposed against municipal employees 
“does not … necessarily constitute a determination of one’s rights and obligations in a suit at 
law, nor does it, except in cases of sanctions that…are penal in nature, amount to a determination 
of a criminal charge within the meaning of …[A]rticle 14.”322  It then concluded that while a 
disciplinary decision need not be decided by a court or tribunal, when “a judicial body is 
entrusted with the task of deciding on the imposition of disciplinary measures, it must respect the 
guarantee of equality of all persons before the courts and tribunals as enshrined in Article 14 … 
and the principles of impartiality, fairness and equality of arms implicit in this guarantee.”323  
Thus, in Perterer, first the Committee stated that sanctions akin to criminal penalties, by 																																																								
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exception, are afforded Article 14 protections, and then it further qualified that where this 
exception does not apply, judicial bodies taking disciplinary action must respect the rights 
enshrined in Article 14. 
The ICJ has opined that the UN has an “international legal personality” in that it may 
bring suit against states for breaches of international law.  This carries with it an implied 
obligation of the UN to abide by the international norms pursuant to which it brings suits and 
“relevant to its constitutional purposes and functions.”324 
It follows from the above that the UN is obligated to uphold human rights, more 
specifically, due process rights, in the determination of sanction imposition on individuals and 
entities as a result of its obligations under the UN Charter, its “legal personality,” and its exercise 
of judicial and quasi-judicial functions no matter whether the action is considered administrative.  
Surely the subsidiary organs of the UN agree, as they have irrefutably made strides toward 
achieving a more procedurally fair regime that comports with human rights despite 
pronouncements by certain organs that they are not obliged to do so.  Notwithstanding the 
improvements, professor of international law, Jose Alvarez, in 2003, offered insight ahead of his 
time regarding a plausible explanation for why the 1267 Regime, with its obscure procedures and 
lack of appeal process, has been able to operate in exception of international law for so long. 
Alvarez classified the Regime as an instrument of hegemonic international law 
“characterized by indeterminate rules -- whose vagueness benefits primarily (if not solely) the 
hegemon.”325  “Global HIL results from the privileged position accorded to the hegemon under 
the existing rules and institutions of international law.”326  With respect to the 1267 Regime, he 
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indicated that the U.S. and UK were the hegemons.327  As evidence for this assertion, he 
submitted that they proposed individuals for designation to which the other less powerful, less 
resourceful members could not easily object.328  They blocked delisting requests submitted by 
other members by creating procedural hurdles.329  Even the lists are “limited to alleged members 
of the Taliban or Al Qaeda, … respond[ing] primarily to the terrorist threats posed to the 
hegemon and its allies but not to other such threats.330  Indeed, as already mentioned above, 
Biersteker noted that in the Regime’s infancy, U.S. proposals for designation were adopted 
nearly without question.  Thus, the Security Council action that gave rise to the Regime was 
“quite plausibly lawful,” “quite plausibly necessary” and not “manifestly illegitimate in a 
political sense,”331 but it did blend “hegemonic power with law.”332  In this respect, the failure to 
robustly address human rights concerns along the way could be credited to the lack of attention 
paid to them by the hegemonic U.S.  For example, rather than criticizing violations of human 
rights in the Regime, the U.S. spent more time stressing the importance of state compliance and 
implementations of sanctions measures and pushing for consequences for their failures, 
disregarding the possibility that state failures resulted from their hesitation to abide by rights-
conflicting measures.333  Ultimately, the U.S. position that human rights were a necessary 
casualty of the “global war on terror” and the willingness of other states to follow suit might 
have not only perpetuated the existence and continuance of a rights-violating Regime, but likely 
also irreparably damaged the credibility and effectiveness of the Regime, with the minor 
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improvements along the way not significant enough to have repaired the damage already done.334  
Conclusions 
The 1267 Sanctions Regime began as one whose noncompliance with internationally 
recognized human rights was a non-issue.  Its increasing use post 9/11, however, brought certain 
issues to the forefront through judicial challenges and corresponding intra-UN challenges, which 
combined to compel Security Council action.  The Security Council actions transformed the 
Regime into one that was more transparent and overall more rights abiding despite its position 
that the Regime was inherently sound because it was carrying on administratively and enforcing 
only temporary precautionary measures.  In contradicting its position, the Security Council’s 
actions demonstrated its knowledge that it was acting ultra vires.  
Notwithstanding, the current Regime still lacks the rights necessary to operating a quasi- 
judicial process that results in penalties akin to criminal punishment.  The deprivation of 
substantive rights accomplished through the deprivation of procedural rights has, as stated above, 
acted as one of the great counter-terrorism tools.  Special judicial and quasi-judicial institutions 
maintained for the purpose of countering terrorism, such as the 1267 Regime, are founded on due 
process exceptionalism, making it impossible for such institutions to both carry out the purpose 
for which they were created while upholding human rights.   
The problem has been characterized as a failure to distinguish between times of peace 
and times of war, an issue that yields exceptional international law to govern “the middle 
ground.”335  Such law operates outside of “traditional diplomatic settings,” “overlook[s]… the 
domestic/international divide” and includes various actors, therefore “serv[ing] not as [a] limit of 
																																																								
334 See Foot, 510-511. 
335 Uruena, Rene. “International Law as Administration: The UN's 1267 Sanctions Committee and the Making of the 
War on Terror.” International Organizations Law Review 4.2 (2008): 321-342. 331-32. 
 69 
power, but as …constitut[ive of it].”336  It delegates power to international organizations and 
“non-representative functionaries” “to make decisions, impose sanctions and affect lives,” and 
“defines procedures, competences and draws frontiers of possibility.”337  
One author, drawing on professor of law and philosophy David Dyzenhaus’ conceptions 
of legal black and grey holes, concluded that the Regime operates in a “legal grey hole” or a 
“space where there is a façade or form of the rule of law but no substantive constitutional 
protections in place.”338  Such can be found “in the 'imaginative experiments in institutional 
design' developed in the national security context that are nominally 'designed to uphold the rule 
of law [but] run the risk of undermining it'.”339  “Legal grey holes” along with “legal black 
holes” sit at the “rule by law” end of Dyzenhaus’ continuum of how law operates in times of 
exception, with “rule of law” at the other end.340 
A paradigm operating in a space of exception in international law cannot be compatible 
with human rights.  This is not limited to the 1267 Sanctions Regime.  The English Star Chamber 
was established in the 15th century by King Henry VII to try those so prominent that ordinary 
courts would render bias decisions.  Its enchanting name, derived from the stars on its ceiling, 
was not suggestive of its administration of justice.  Rather, its “enduring legacy” is one of 
“secrecy, severity and extreme injustice.”341  The Court’s increasing self-conferred jurisdiction 
came to extend over ordinary civil and criminal misdemeanor cases,342 which it decided without 
a jury, delivering punishments ranging from fines and public humiliation to life sentences and 																																																								
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physical harm, but stopping short of death.343  The court’s proceedings were arbitrary.  Its 
judgments, made by those closest to the King, were merely extensions of the King’s will, leaving 
the proceedings open to abuse as “political tools” to “quell constitutional and religious dissent” 
during a time of economic strife.344  Court officials conducted interrogations of witnesses and 
defendants, in secret, and outside of the presence of representative legal counsel.345  Judgments 
were based entirely on documentary evidence and the only time the defendant was brought 
before the Chamber was when judgment was entered, or when he was obligated to appear in his 
own defense, without legal counsel, to accept judgment after having confessed, remained silent, 
or incriminated himself.346   
One author suggested that the court’s abolition in 1641, rather than resulting from a 
“failure in the administration of justice,” was one of a “decline in legitimacy” resulting from the 
court’s coercive enforcement.347  Invoking the ideas of philosopher, sociologist, jurist and 
political economist Max Weber, the author offered that legitimacy in this context derives from 
“the belief that there is a moral obligation to obey authority whether that belief is rooted in 
tradition, normative conviction, or legal-rational principles. Because [it] derives from one’s own 
beliefs and judgments, it …must be voluntarily given, not forcibly seized.”348  Thus, when 
authority’s directives are seen as illegitimate, challenging “tradition, normative convictions or 
legal-rational principles” it decreases willingness to obey.349  The resistance, in turn, incites 
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coercive enforcement by those in authority to maintain compliance.350  Eventually, the paradigm 
yields to increasing resistance and illegitimacy, ending in its destruction.351 
In the case of the Star Chamber, England’s economic downturn, coupled with “attacks on 
its economic well-being, the historic and traditional values of worship, the basis of ecclesiastical 
authority, and the royal prerogative power,” increased opposition to the Crown resulting in its 
diminished authority.352  In an effort to recoup its power, the Crown took coercive measures via 
the Star Chamber to silence opposition and enforce the Crown’s religious position.353  Rather 
than “reinforce[ing] obedience, [this reinforced] resistance” ending in the inevitable abolition of 
the Star Chamber.354 
The modern day 1267 Regime is startlingly similar to the Star Chamber of the 15th 
century.  It should be noted that the objections to and eventual abolition of the Star Chamber 
came during a time in England during which there was a public push for greater recognition of 
due process guarantees and individual liberties.355  The U.S. Supreme Court has cited the Star 
Chamber in multiple decisions relevant to due process rights, specifically, the privilege against 
self-incrimination.  In Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422 (1956), the Court insinuated that 
the privilege originated to prevent “a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if 
not in their stark brutality.”356  The modern day exceptional courts that bear due procedural 
defects similar to the Star Chamber exist despite the already accomplished achievement of 
internationally recognized due process rights and individual liberties that the people of the 15th 
century were still only hoping for.  There is no place for such paradigms in the 21st century.  																																																								
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Nonetheless, one should take note of the relationship between legitimacy and coercion expressed 
above.  Weber used it in the context of states, the author applied it to a time of kingdoms, but it 
can equally be applied here to the relationship between the UN and states.  In the context of the 
1267 Regime, coercing states to comply with Security Council measures seen as ultra vires and 
violative of the human rights that states are obligated to protect through their own conventions 
has only resulted in repeated judicial and institutional challenges which yield decisions that 
reduce the legitimacy of the Regime.  Continued challenges may generate state reluctance to 
propose names or implement sanctions measures, an avenue the HRC already intimated when it 
found Belgium violated Sayadi’s and Vinck’s human rights because it could have refrained from 
designating them until the national investigation was through.  Escalating futility of the Regime, 
in turn, may cause it to suffer the same fate as the Star Chamber. 
Other similar paradigms include Ireland’s Special Criminal Court created in 1972 by the 
powers vested in the Assembly of Ireland through Article 38 of Ireland’s Constitution and Part V 
of the Offences against the State Act, 1939, to handle terrorism-related crime.357  The court 
operates without a jury and over the years, has only expanded the scheduled offenses it is able to 
hear.358  Dissent and calls for abolition from the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, the Irish 
Human Rights Committee, Amnesty International, and the UN Human Rights Committee have 
been ignored.359  A second special criminal court has recently been established to deal with the 
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first SCC’s backlog.360  A similarly exceptional court in the U.S., the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, was established pursuant to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (1978) to 
assess and rule on warrant requests submitted by law enforcement agencies in the name of 
combatting terrorism.361  The court has been criticized for having no oversight or public pressure 
because it functions secretly.  The court permanently sits ex parte, hearing arguments only from 
government attorneys without public participation362 in contravention of the U.S. Constitution’s 
due process provisions.  Both the proceedings of the FISC and the records thereof are kept secret 
from the public, with few exceptions.363  Since its inception, the FISC has granted tens of 
thousands of warrants, denying only few,364 indicating the court enforces a lesser burden than 
that typically preceding constitutionally consistent searches and seizures.  Guantanamo Military 
Commissions established post 9/11, re-authorized via the Military Commissions Act (“MCA”) of 
2006 and its progeny MCA 2009, similarly took an abbreviated route to so-called justice.  
Despite some improvements to the Commissions along the way, they typically operated in a 
manner that deprived the defendants of selecting their representation, made use of evidence 
obtained through torture or coercion, and denied access to witnesses.365  In 1996, U.S. Alien 
Terrorist Removal Court was created pursuant to legislation. Modeled after the FISC, this court 
provided a forum to try suspected terrorists for the purpose of deportation without exposing 
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classified national security information.366  To date, the court has not been used but remains 
prepared.367  In January 2016, Egypt’s parliament ratified an anti-terror law that established 
special courts and provided extra protection against legal recourse for law enforcement officers 
that use force.368  
In consideration of the creation, existence, and progression of the 1267 Regime as 
outlined above, it can be concluded that the 1267 Regime and other similar extraordinary 
judicial/quasi-judicial institutions, such as those mentioned above, can never be compliant with 
human rights because these institutions inherently employ shortcuts in due process to carry out 
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